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I. INTRODUCTION
In the present world crisis, one's views on the scope to be ac-
corded basic civil liberties, such as the rights of free speech and
assembly, depend on a number of variables too complex for con-
venient labelling as politically "liberal" or "conservative." If we
assume a consensus among American leaders of opinion on the
value of protecting and preserving the personal immunities guaran-
teed by the state and federal "bills of rights," there is still the vex-
ing problem of means, choice of which may not only be dictated
by intelligence and experience, but by the degree of attachment
to these fundamental rights, a matter more of faith than empirical
demonstration. Thus we find at one pole of opinion, the view that
now, as never before in our nation's history, civil liberties should
be upheld and even extended, for it is our respect for the individual
conscience that spells the essential difference between our system
and the totalitarian regime which opposes us. If by limitation of the
sphere of individual freedom of choice we destroy this respect for
and tolerance of dissent, there will be nothing in America worth sav-
ing.' The opposing view, which tends on the whole to assess the
internal danger to security as much greater, holds that restrictions
are necessary to protect the efficient operation of government
"which is an essential precondition to the existence of all civil
liberties.' 2 Dealing as we are with imponderables in the field of
social dynamics, neither view can be dismissed out-of-hand as
"unrealistic." The tide at present, however, is setting in the direc-
tion of the latter perspective, accelerated, some fear, by an emo-
tional impulse to do anything nominally "anti-communist" if it has
* Assistant Professor, College of Law, The Ohio State University
I Some recent writings by adherents to this view are: BARTH, THE LoYALTY
oF Fans MEN¢ (1951); BmDLE, THm FEAOF FREmEOM (1951); Carr, National Se-
curity and Individual Freedom, XLII YALE REVIEW 496 (June, 1953); Davis,
Are We Worth Saving? And If So, Why? 207 Harpers 23 (Aug. 1953); Doug-
his, The Black Silence of Fear, N.Y. Times Magazine, Jan. 13, 1952, p. 7;
Kennan, Communism and Conformity, N.Y. Herald Tribune, May 20, 1953.
2 Quotation from the dissenting opinion of Vinson, C.J., in Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699,715 (1948). The most outspoken advocates of re-
straints on political liberties are often the erstwhile "left-wingers" such as
WmEY, THE BATTLE AGAINST DIswyALTy (1951); Book Review, 44 J. Cam. L.
& CInuxo ay 84 (1953). However, not all former "insiders" of the Com-
munist apparatus are of this persuasion. See, e.g., PHmLmcx, I LE THREE
Lw._s 299-300 (1952).
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the least chance of exorcising the troubles that plague us. In its
recent session, the Ohio Legislature by certain enactments has
taken the "calculated risk" that we do not "burn down the house
to kill the rats."3
By way of background to discussion and analysis of the three
anti-subversive measures recently passed by the General Assem-
bly, it will be well to describe what preceded this legislative action,
in terms of investigation of the nature and extent of the evil to be
dealt with, and pre-existing statutes aimed generally at the same
problem. So much of a high quality has been written in the profes-
sional periodicals and treatises on the subject of resolving the con-
flict of "freedom versus internal security" and on specific control
measures both state and national, 4 that no attempt will be here
made to survey the whole field, but an endeavor will be made to
bring in these outside matters only when they seem to be germane
to an evalution of the new Ohio laws. Because these laws will be
executed both in conjunction with federal anti-subversive legis-
lation and within the limitations imposed by the United States
Supreme Court through the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution, it will be necessary to allude frequently to recent national
legislation and federal court decisions. The scope of this paper
forbids treatment of these national matters on their merits, both
constitutional and otherwise, and they will be accepted as estab-
lished conditions within which the Ohio laws will operate and be
tested.5
3 This phrase was used by Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois in his
message accompanying the veto of Senate Bill No. 202, a criminal and inves-
tigatory measure substantially similar to the Ohio Devine Law, here discussed.
Reproduced in BuscH, ADLAI E. STEVENsON OF ILLINOIS 135-144 (1952).
4 Chafee, Thirty-five Years with Freedom of Speech, 1 KAx. L. REv.
1 (1952); Cohen and Fuchs, Communism's Challenge and the Constitution, 34
COR EL L. Q. 182-219, 352-375 (1948); Meildejohn, What Does the First
Amendment Mean? 20 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 461 (1953); O'Brien, New Encroach-
ments on Individual Freedom, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1952); Sutherland, Free-
dom and Internal Security, 64 HAav. L. REV. 383 (1951). See also GELLOmR,
THE STATEs AND SUBvERSION 358-392 (1952); LAssWELL, NATIONAL SEcuarrY Am
INDIIUAL FREEDOI (1950).
SMuch of the federal legislation aimed at the control of the Communist
conspiracy has not been tested in the courts, notably the criminal and
registration features of the "Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950," 64
STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 783 (a), 786 (Supp. 1952), and the Smith Act of
1940 as applied to membership and individual advocacy of overthrow rather
than to conspiracy, 54 STAT. 670 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp.
1952). The major Supreme Court decisions upholding restrictive measures have
been rendered by a divided court, with either no affirming opinion securing
a majority as in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), leaving the
rationale of constitutionality unclear, or no opinions at all because of an
equal division of the Justices, as in Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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II. THE Oiuo BACKGROUND
As in the present instance, so in the past, the Ohio legislature
has seen fit to shape its program for control of subversive activi-
ties substantially in accord with national trends or "fashions" in
statute law. This observation is not made with any deprecatory
intent, but only to indicate that the Ohio law-makers are not alone
in apprehending at certain crucial times in the course of the coun-
try's history certain dangers of political subversion. Thus, a large
number of states including Ohio enacted their laws against treason
and misprision of treason during the perilous times of the Civil
War, punishing knowing adherence to enemies of the state, or giv-
ing them aid and comfort, or suppressing information that any
person has committed or is about to commit this offense.0 Between
1917 and 1923, twenty-five states passed criminal syndicalism or
criminal anarchy statutes in response to the activities of the I.W.W.
and the "Bolsheviks." Ohio is among those jurisdictions having
the former type of law and in addition, a law, enacted during the
same period of the "Red Raids" of Attorney General Palmer,
prohibiting the display of red and black flags and other emblems
as symbols of the advocacy of or belief in activities antagonistic
to our form of government. 7 When the United States Supreme
Court in 1931 held an identical "flag" statute of California void
on its face for indefiniteness, only California amended it so as to
conform with the decision, putting in grave question the validity of
the Ohio-type law.8 The "criminal syndicalism" law punishes the
support of the doctrine or of any organization advocating or teach-
ing "the commission of crime, sabotage (as defined in the act), or
6 Oo REv. CODE §§ 2921.01, 2921.02 (1953).
71d. §§ 2923.12, 2923.13, 2923.14, 2923.15 and § 2921.07. Two-thirds of the
states passed such laws from 1917 to 1921. See Dow=., A HISTORY OF CRIBUMnI
SYNDICALisM LorsLATIoN im =6 UNrrn STATES (1939). The criminal anarchy,
as distinct from syndicalism, laws were patterned after the New York Law
of 1902 (Penal Laws, § § 160, 161) and denounced the written or oral advocacy
of "the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force
or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive
officials of government, or by any unlawful means."
8 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.359 (1931). The Ohio "flag" statute
denounces the display not only of the banner of an anarchistic society, but
a red or black flag with an inscription (a) opposed to organized govern-
ment; (b) which is sacrilegious; or (c) which may be derogatory to public
morals. As only a stimulus to anarchistic action necessarily involves an in-
citement to violence, the portion of the statute specifying the other modes of
violation is fatally "vague and indefinite" in permitting "the punishment of
the fair use of the opportunity of free political discussion" Because a nar-
rowing judicial construction of clauses a, b, and c is of dubious propriety, the
unamended statute could probably not be applied even to conduct which
is not constitutionally protected. Note, Inseparability in Application of Statutes
Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HaRy. L. REv. 1208 (1948).
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unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terror-
isms as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform."
Although the earliest model for this type of law was drafted to
meet the menace of anarchism and not Communism, its progeny
were successfully used in a number of states in the post-World War
I era against the latter society, and were upheld as to their inherent
constitutionality by appellate court majorities on both the state
and national level.9 As will be discussed later, its "membership"
and "unlawful assembly" provisions certainly went to the very
limit allowable under the First Amendment. Yet the Ohio Un-
American Activities Commission, which recommended the legis-
lation to be discussed here, felt the old law was inadequate to
counter the threat of modern conspiratorial "fifth column" activi-
ties, largely, it would seem, because the term "criminal syndical-
isn" has passed out of common usage, and "there is no public
feeling against a concept of which few, if any, are aware."' 0
Prior to America's entry into the last great war, during the
tense period of preparedness, Ohio, along with thirteen other
states," excluded from recognition as political parties, and hence
from a place on the ballot, any group "which advocates, either di-
rectly or indirectly, the overthrow, by force or violence, of our
local, state, or national government .... or is connected in any way
with any foreign government or power."' 2 Although the threat of
industrial sabotage and espionage issued from both Bundist and
Communist undergrounds prior to June of 1941, after that date the
danger came mainly from the Nazi quarter whose Wehrmacht had
9Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); State v. Kassay, 126 Ohio
St. 177 (1932). The results were the same in most other jurisdictions, with
little uniformity, however, in the frequency or manner of application. See
Note, Criminal Syndicalism and the Civil Liberties, 36 Ir. L. Rnv. 357 (1941).
Anarchists and Communists, though antithetical in ideology, are as one in
desiring the abolition of the present system-hence both may engage in
incendiary mouthings in their writings or speeches. Thus, while the syn-
dicalism statutes, loosely construed, literally describe Communist activity,
the serious legal question which divided both the United States and Ohio
Supreme Courts was whether the states under the constitutional free speech
and assembly clauses could punish speech which advocated crime where there
was a remote "pernicious tendency" or only language which under the par-
ticular circumstances clearly and imminently threatened violence and viola-
tion of the law. Holmes and Brandeis, J.J., and the dissenting judges in the
Kassay case felt that the "clear and present danger" test should he applied
regardless of whether the legislature had defined the crime in speech or
non-speech terms. See dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.652, 660 (1925).
1OReport of the Un-American Activities Commisison, State of Ohio 30-31
(1953). Hereafter cited as "Ohio Report."
11 See Prendergast, State Legislatures and Communism: The Current
Scene, 44 ADu. POL. SCL REv. 556,557 (1950).
12 Omo REV. CoDE § 3517 07.
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suddenly turned its guns on Russia, ending the period of the de-
nounced "imperialist war." We know now to our dismay that war-
time friendship with the Soviet Union did not preclude even acts
of espionage, especially in the applied sciences of war.13 The legal
exclusion from the ballot, however, struck not at fifth column ac-
tivity but at the democratic process which traditionally has offered
its elective machinery to all comers. 14 While there may or may not
be an anomaly in barring a group from the use of democratic
methods on the basis of the fact that the group itself does not use
democratic methods, there would seem to have been little real
justification for it in view of the chronic political impotence in this
country of all foreign totalitarian groups.15 The effect of such a
denial of suffrage could only confirm the visionary radical in his
belief that underhanded methods are alone efficacious in securing
power. Exclusion under the Ohio-type statute resulted either from
refusal to file a party affidavit disavowing advocacy of what the
law forbade or an ex parte determination by the secretary of state
of facts contrary to those asserted by the group. The cases constru-
ing and applying these statutes being few and somewhat incon-
clusive, their validity is as yet uncertain.16
13See, e.g., Rosenberg et al. v. United States, 195 F2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. den. 344 U.S. 838 (1952). The extent of pre-war and wartime Communist
infiltration of the various departments and agencies of the national govern-
ment is summarized in the report of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, etc., SEN. Misc.
REP., 83D. Coxa., IST. SEss. 26-46 (1953).
14 As in most states, Ohio recognizes a group seeking public office as a
"political party" only if (a) it polled for its candidate for governor in the pre-
ceding election at least ten per cent of the entire vote cast therein; or (b) it files
with the state secretary a petition signed by "qualified electors equal in number
to at least fifteen per cent of the total vote for governor at the lastpreceding elec-
tion." After being accorded a place on the ballot, a subsequent failure to obtain
ten per cent of the votes cast for governor cancels state -recognition. Orno
Rv. CoDE § 3517.01 (1953).
Is The high water mark of Communist voting strength was reached in
1932, a few months before the bank holiday, when its candidate for the
presidency, William Z. Foster, received 102,991 ballots at the polls. Since
then its popular support has declined so that candidate Eadl Browder received
only 48,579 votes in 1940. Information Please Almanac, 206-208 (1953).
"If we are to take judicial notice of the threat of Communists within
the nation, it should not be difficult to conclude that as a political party they
are of little consequence .... I would doubt that there is a village, let alone
a city or county or state which the Communists could carry in any election.
Communism in the world scene is no bogey-man; but Communists as a po-
litical faction or party in this country plainly is .... The country is not in
despair; the people know Soviet Communism; the doctrine of Soviet revolu-
tion is exposed in all of its ugliness and the American people want none of it."
Douglas, J., dissenting in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544 (1951).
16Upheld by an Ohio court of appeals in State ex Berry v. Hummel, 42
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With the end of the "Popular Front against Fascism" in 1945
and the beginning of the "Cold War," a flood of state laws against
subversion was loosed, evincing many and diverse ends and meth-
ods of approach. Certain legislative goals, however, are common
to this mass of recent state statute law, and their articulation here
may be helpful in evaluating the appropriateness of the Ohio anti-
subversive measures adopted during the recent sessions of the
legislature. These are:
(1) To take additional security measures to prevent com-
munist infiltration into positions of state employment,
or at least those positions which involve trust or in-
fluence.
(2) To prevent communists from gaining support, finan-
cial or otherwise, from those who would withdraw
their aid if the true nature and purpose of the sup-
ported organizations were disclosed.
(3) To take such measures as will enable consumers of
Communist propaganda to become cognizant of its
origin.
(4) To acquire such information as will enable the state
government to know the identity and whereabouts of
all those whose "allegiance" is to the communist
party.
(5) To make criminal those activities which have as their
purpose the setting up in the United States of a totali-
tarian government under foreign control.
(6) To deny the Communists the use of the ordinary
means of the democratic process, and the privileges
of state citizenship.17
III. THE GENEsIs OF THE RECENT ENACTMENTS
Prior to the convening of the 100th General Assembly in Ohio,
the only post-War anti-subversive legislation that had gone on the
books sought to make unemployed Communists ineligible to re-
ceive benefits from the state. This statute, passed in 1949, bars
the payment of such compensation to anyone who advocates, or is
a member of a party which advocates, the overthrow of govern-
ment by force. The jobless person must file an affidavit declaring
Ohio L. Abs. 40, 59 N.E. 2d 238 (1944); see also Johnson v. Sweeney, 140
Ohio St. 279, 43 N.E. (2d) 239 (1942). The California Supreme Court held in
Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Calif. 2d 536, 127 P. 2d 889 (1942) that a sim-
ilar provision in its election law could be applied to any particular party only
after opportunity for notice, hearing and judicial review; cf. State ex rel.
Huff v. Reeves, 5 Wash. 2d 637, 106 P. 2d 729 (1940). But cf. Field v. Hall,
201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W. 2d 567 (1940).17 This formulation of the immediate goals of such legislation is taken
with some modification from the excellent analysis of the Mundt-Nixon Bill
by Cohen and Fuchs in Communism's Challenge to the Constitution, 34 CoRNEM
L.Q. 182, 186-187 (1948). A recent resume of all the state anti-subversive laws
enacted prior to the 1953 legislative sessions can be found in The States and
Subversion, A.C.L.U., 1953.
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that he is in neither of the proscribed classes.' s In June of 1951,
however, with the Korean War in full tilt, the Ohio legislature
set up an interim study commission, to be known as the Ohio Un-
American Activities Commission, to, inter alia, investigate and re-
port to the 1953 session of the General Assembly on "the operation
and effect of the laws of this state, of the several other states, and
of the United States, which purport to outlaw and control the ac-
tivities [of subversive persons and groups] and to recommend such
additional legislation or revision of existing laws as may seem
advisable and necessary."'19 The "Blackburn Commission," as it
came later to be called, was endowed, in addition, with a fact-find-
ing function with the attendant authority to compel testimony and
the production of books and records, which placed it in a field al-
ready occupied by a number of Congressional investigating com-
mittees and, on the state level, recently abandoned by six other
"little un-American activities committees. '20 By holding public
hearings, whereat witnesses both friendly and unfriendly were
examined, issuing press releases and reports, initiating prosecution
of recalcitrant witnesses,2 1 and compiling central files and dossiers
1S OHo REV. CODE § 4141.29 (1953). Upheld in Dworken v. Collopy, 56
Ohio L. Abs. 513, 91 N,. 2d 564 (1950).
19 Omo GEN. CODE §§ 76-28 to 76-35, inclusive (Supp. 1952). The ad-
ditional terms of reference of the Commission were: "(1) To investigate, study
and analyse (a) all facts relating to the activities of persons, groups, and or-
ganizations whose membership includes persons who have as their objective
or may be suspected of having as their objective the overthrow or reform
of our constitutional governments by fraud, force, violence, or other unlaw-
ful means; (b) all facts concerning persons, groups, and organizations known
to be or suspected of being dominated by or giving allegiance to a foreign
power or whose activities might adversely affect the contribution of this state
to the national defense, the safety and security of this state, the functioning
of any agency of the state or national government or the industrial po-
tential of this state; (2) To maintain a liaison with any agency of the federal,
state, or local governments in devising and promoting means of disclosing
those persons and groups who seek to alter or destroy the government of
this state or of the United States by force, violence, intimidation, sabotage or
threats of the same." (§76-31).
2 0 California (1941-1950), see BAaR=, THE TENNEY CommWIr=E (1951);
Washington (1947-1949), see CoumTYxAx, UN-A-EarcAc Acrivrnms n THE
STATE OF WAsHINGTON (1951); Illinois (1947-1949), see HA sHA, The Broyles
Commission iN THE STATEs AND SUBVERsIoN 54 (Gellhorn ed. 1952); Massachu-
setts (1950), no hearings were held - report issued; New Hampshire (1949),
no hearings were held- report issued recommending reliance on federal
enforcement; New Jersey (1947), closed meetings-no report. In addition,
Arizona and Florida appointed committees which did not function.
21 According to the Report of the Blackburn Commission twenty witnesses
were cited for contempt (p. 13). To the writer's present knowledge none has
yet been convicted in the common pleas courts. Witness Oscar Smilack
(see Report, p. 229), allegedly the "angel" for the Franklin County branch of
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on suspect individuals and groups, the Commission in effect could
subserve most, if not all, of the particular legislative goals hereto-
fore mentioned. That it was aware of the contribution it could
make to public education on the subject of domestic communism
for the purpose of discouraging unwitting support and membership
in certain private organizations cannot be gainsaid.22 That it ever
pursued the object of laying a basis for the discharge of balky wit-
nesses by private and state employers is less clear, although that
incidental effect did in fact follow. 23 On the credit side, it must
be observed that the Commission conducted itself with fairness
and scrupulosity in most instances, considering the sensational and
emotionally-laden subject with which it dealt, avoiding the ex-
cesses of some of its institutional forerunners. 24 On the debit side,
the Ohio Communist Party, was committed, at the time of arraignment, to
the Lima State Mental Hospital for examination into sanity. He protested the
commitment which was made solely on motion of the prosecutor and with-
out the introduction of any evidence beyond the unverified statement by coun-
sel for the state. The legality of Smilack's detention was tested by habeas
corpus proceedings, and on April 22, 1953, the Ohio Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the order of discharge granted by the Court of Appeals,
holding the summary commitment in violation of both state and federal
"due process." State, ex rel. Smilack v. Bushong, 159 Ohio St. 259, 111 N.E. 2d
918 (1953). The reluctance of the state to press for trial in the contempt cases
(in which indictments have already been returned) may be partly due to
doubts concerning the applicability of either the legislative or court con-
tempt statutes contained in the Criminal Code. The statute setting up this
Interim Investigating Commission expressly referred to the court contempt
sections (OHio REv. CoDE §§ 2705.02-2705.09) for sanction, while witness
Smilack, cit. supra, was apparently indicted for contempt of the legislature
(Omo Rev. CODE § 2917.42).
22 See, e.g., portions of the colloquies with witnesses Baxter and Cvetic
dealing with the utility of a "commission such as this" in appraising members
of subversive or "front" groups of Communist control or manipulation. Ohio
Report, pp. 38, 49, 72.23 Two of the witnesses before the Commission were employees of Ohio
State University, viz., graduate assistant George D. Pappas and fine arts
instructor Marston A. Hamlin. Both proved to be extremely uncooperative
witnesses during a public hearing in Columbus on May 20, 1952, and short-
ly thereafter were relieved of their positions at the University. See Ohio
Report, pp. 365-378. Columbus Citizen, Jan. 18, 1953, p. 20, col. 1.24 See especially the accounts of the Tenney and Broyles committees, note
20, supra. The Commission as a matter of policy permitted legal counsel
to accompany the witness into the hearing room to advise on questions of
constitutional rights, and allowed witnesses the right to offer signed state-
ments to supplement testimony. Persons "adversely mentioned" in any public
hearing were accorded the privilege of appearing before the body and an op-
portunity to rebut. See Report, p. 12. The Commission, however, incurred
some unfavorable publicity by releasing to Cincinnati newspapers the secret
testimony of one Cecil Scott which labelled a number of respectable citizens
as Communists or "pro-Communist." Four of those named publicly de-
nied the accusation and demanded an immediate hearing- this was fi-
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as observed by Governor Lausche in his veto message on the
recommended anti-sedition measure, hereafter discussed, the body
"has not brought to the bar of justice a single person guilty of
sedition, treason, or acts contemplating the overthrow of our gov-
ernment.
25
In January of this year, the Commission filed its report to the
General Assembly, a document of over four-hundred pages, con-
sisting of twenty-six pages of conclusions and recommendations.
Part II of the report contained transcripts of testimony of twenty-
nine selected witnesses, (a) seventeen of whom were manifestly
uncooperative, if not verbally defiant, and repeatedly invoked the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination making the in-
terrogation for large sections of record wholly unilateral; (b) nine
of whom were formerly Communist Party members, some recant-
ing their past beliefs and others paid agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation who had successfully infiltrated the Party's secret
enclaves; and (c) the remaining three were experts on education,
called to give their views on how the schools and colleges should
be safeguarded from Communist subversion and their pupils im-
munized against indoctrination of alien ideology.2 6 Besides the find-
ings which duplicate those of previous federal investigations with
regard to the structure, methods, and purposes of the Communist
Party, U.S.A., 27 which have become common knowledge to any-
nally accorded nine months later. The Cincinnati Chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union characterized Scott as a former F.B.I. paid informer
with a felony record and a past history of mental disorder. The four citi-
zens named as Communists were, reportedly, never permitted to cross-ex-
amine their accuser. See printed statement re Ohio Un-American Activities
Commission (A.C.L.U., Cincinnati Chapter, Jan. 1953) circulated to public of-
ficials and civic organizations throughout the state.25 House Calendar, 100th Gen. Assembly, July 31, 1953, p. 2.
26These last three expert witnesses were Sidney G. Kusworm, Chair-
man of the American Citizenship Committee, Ohio State Bar Association; R.
M. Garrison, Director of the Secondary Elementary Department, State Board
of Education; Douglas McGregor, President Antioch College, Yellow Springs,
Ohio. Dr. McGregor was the only witness, whose testimony was published,
who challenged the "unarticulated assumption" that young people's minds
were passive receptacles into which either dangerous ideologies were poured
or "Americanism." He went on to say:
One thing that seems to me to be perfectly clear is that young
people never take an idea at face value and accept it and swal-
low it. They spend most of their time arguing about the things
that are told to them in the classroom or that they read in the
textbooks. So long as that is true, I have much less fear of the
indoctrination idea that comes from just straight propaganda.
I think experience generally would bear me out on other college
campuses as well." (Ohio Report, p. 351.)27 See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 1844, 90TH CoNG., 2d SEss. (1948); H-.R. REP.
No. 209, 80mn. CoNG.. lsr. SEss. (1947).
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one who even occasionally peruses the public prints, the Comnis-
sion found several Ohio labor, civic, and youth organizations to be
"fronting" for the Party, and assessed active Party membership
in the state for 1952 at thirteen hundred, about half of whom oper-
ate in the Cleveland metropolitan area.28 No estimate was attempt-
ed of the number of non-registered sympathizers or "fellow travel-
lers" in the jurisdiction who are "ready, willing, and able to do the
Party's work" if called on, though the Director of the F.B.I. is
quoted as quoting a Communist boast that there exist in this coun-
try ten for every one on the party rolls.29
Of the Commission's five recommendations for new state anti-
subversive legislation, the first four were ultimately enacted by the
100th General Assembly, two of which required overriding a vig-
orous gubernatorial veto. Representative Samuel Devine of Frank-
lin County introduced a bill to effectuate the 5th object of deny-
ing from the state and local governments "special privileges or
licenses to members of the Communist Party or subversive organi-
zations."3 0 The bill contemplated the filing by an applicant for any
license issuable by the state or its subdivisions of an affirmation
disavowing present membership in any subversive organization
or, by name, the Communist party. A subversive group was defined
as one advocating forcible overthrow of state or national govern-
ment, but what official or agency was supposed to so characterize
particular groups, and whether an applicant need only deny affili-
ation with groups whose unlawful objectives were known to him
at the time of filing, was left to administrative omniscience. This
bill died in the House Judiciary Committee. The three bills which
have finally become law in Ohio are (1) a strict sedition statute,
which not oily creates new crimes against the state but establishes
its own enforcement and investigative machinery; (2) a law mak-
ing advocacy of forcible overthrow or membership in a society so
advocating sufficient cause for removal of public employees and
teachers in state supported institutions; and (3) a measure which
makes claim of privilege against self-incrimination in response to
questions propounded by a governmental body concerning member-
ship in a subversive group, conclusive on the question of fitness
28 Ohio Report, p. 32.
29 The quotation is taken from the testimony of J. E. Hoover, Hear-
ings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on H.R. 1834 and
H. 2122, 80TH ConG., lsT. SEss. 37 (1947). Recently United States Attorney
General Herbert Brownell was reported as stating that Party membership
"is cut down to about 25,000 now from 100,000- one-fourth of what it was
before the Smith Act trials started." He felt, however, that the present hard
core presented a greater menace than before in view of better organiza-
tion and increased difficulty of detection. U.S. News & World Report, Sept.
4, 1953, p. 40.
30H.B. No. 630, 100th Gen. Assembly (1953).
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of such person to hold a state job. Of less significance, but xelated
functionally to the enforcement provisions of the new sedition law,
is the statute continuing the life of the Ohio Un-American Ac-
tivities Commission to January 31, 1954, at which time all its "rec-
ords, books, documents, and other property shall be committed to
the attorney general," who, as will be discussed, infra, will be vest-
ed with general supervisory powers over the enforcement of the
new sedition law.3' For convenience the latter measure will be
referred to in the ensuing discussion as the Devine Law, after its
first legislative sponsor.
IV. THE DEvNE SEDiTiON LAw
A. Its Criminal Provisions.
The Devine Law,32 with a few minor modifications, and minus
a lengthy preamble setting forth a description of the world Com-
munist conspiracy, is a carbon-copy of Maryland's Ober Law,33
passed in that state in 1949.34 Within a year of its passage there,
it was adopted in New Hampshire and Mississippi, and was twice
proposed and twice rejected by the state of Illinois.35 As distinct
from the Massachusetts-type statute which outlaws eo nomine the
American Communist Party,36 the present law mentions no groups
by name in any of its sections, but attacks the Communist move-
ment by describing its characteristics. The three most salient of
31 Omo PRv. CODE §§ 103.31 to 103.38 (1953).
32 Omo REV. CODE §§ 2921.21 to 2921.27, incl. Effective date, November 7,
1953. The voting on this bill was as follows: 1st passage, House- yeas 119,
nays 2; Senate- yeas 21, nays 11. 2d passage over Governor's veto, House
- yeas 92, nays 26; Senate- yeas 20, nays 12. Bulletin, 100th Gen. Assembly
p. 244 (20th ed. 1953).
33The Maryland "Ober" law and its now numerous progeny were the
brainchild of Harvard-trained lawyer, Frank B. Ober. His basic ideas re-
garding legislative control of Communism can be found in a speech he de-
livered to the Maryland State Bar Association, published as "Communism
versus the Constitution," 34 A.B.A.J. 645 (August, 1948). His thinking with
reference to academic freedom can be gathered from his correspondence with
Harvard President James Conant and Grenville Clark regarding the con-
tinued retention by the University of two allegedly "fellow-traveling" pro-
fessors. See Freedom at Harvard, 35 Bulletin 313-334 (A.A.U.P., 1949). See
generally, PREDEnEGAST, The Ober Anti-Communist Law, iN STATES AND SuE-
vrasIoN 140 (Gellhorn ed. 1952).
34 MID. AnN. CODE Ai. 85A (1951).
35 N. H. R v. LAws c. 457-A (1951); Miss. ANN. CODE §§ 4064-01 to 4064-11
(Supp. 1952). The Illinois experience is related in Burnett and DeBoer,
Resistance in Illinois, 177 Nation 112 (1953).
36 MAss. AN LAws c. 264, §§ 16 to 23 (Supp. 1952): "The Communist Party
is hereby declared to be a subversive organization." (§ 16a.) Most draftsmen
of anti-Communist legislation have deliberately avoided this technique of
outlawing the Party for fear that such a finding by a non-judicial body of
guilt of a readily determinable class might come within the modern concept
of the "bill of attainder" formulated in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1948).
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these is (1) advocacy of activities intended to overthrow the con-
stitutional form of government of the United States or of this state
by force, violence or other unlawful means; (2) domination, di-
rect or indirect, by a foreign nation, or group of nations; and (3)
advocacy of activities intended to supplant the present constitu-
tional government by any form of government the control of which
is to be vested in any foreign government or foreign organization.
A "subversive organization" within the meaning of the statute is
any group judicially found to have as one of its purposes the ob-
jective described by criterion (1); a "foreign subversive organi-
zation," on the other hand, to fall within the ban need not aim
at the advocacy or teaching of the use of unlawful means but must
satisfy both of the last two criteria. To prevent the forcible over-
throw of government and to forestall the erection in Columbus or
in Washington of a government subservient to a foreign power,
the Devine Law declares felonious (a) any act intended to bring
about overthrow of the present American governments by "force,
violence or other unlawful means" (b) speech advocating or teach-
ing any person to commit such act "under such circumstances as
to constitute a clear and present danger to the security of the Unit-
ed States or of this state"; (c) conspiracy to commit any such act;
(d) assistance in the formation, participation in the activities or
management, or contribution to the support of any subversive or
foreign subversive organization, "knowing such organization to be
a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization";
and lastly, (e) becoming or remaining a member of either type of
organization with knowledge of its subversive character. The of-
fense of mere membership is punishable by imprisonment up to
five years while defendants convicted of any of the other crimes
may be imprisoned for as long as twenty years. An organization
of either type is to be dissolved after being found illegal by a court;
its property is to be forfeited to the state, and its records are to be
turned over to the attorney general of Ohio - presumably for the
initiation of prosecution against individual members. 37
It is gross oversimplification to contend as some of the backers
of the Devine Act did that the constitutional validity of the Ober-
type law has been passed on favorably by the courts.38 The only
3 7 The Ohio legislature apparently relented when it came to permanently
depriving ex-convicts under the Act of their civil rights to hold public office
or employment, to stand for election in the state, and to vote in any election
held in the state. See BID. ANN. CODE c. 85A, § 4 (1951). A forfeiture of these
rights and privileges follows automatically from conviction of any felony in
Ohio. (OHIo REV. CODE § 2961.01). However, after final release from serv-
ice of sentence, the pardon and parole commission must restore these rights.
(OHo RME. CODE § 2965.17).
38 See, e.g., Columbus Dispatch, August 8, 1953, p. 2, col. 1.
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portion of the Maryland law which has as yet survived United
States Supreme Court scrutiny is the provision requiring an af-
fidavit from a candidate for municipal election forswearing en-
gagement "in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the
government by force or violence, and that he is not knowingly a
member of an organization engaged in such an attempt. '39 This
provision40 of the Ober Act dealing wvith the determination of loyal-
ty of persons on the state payroll was not carried over into the
Ohio enactment. More germane to the present question of the valid-
ity of the criminal sanctions which were adopted in Ohio, is the
decision of the Baltimore Circuit Court in 1949 holding these pro-
visions on their face in conflict with "the basic freedoms guaran-
teed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments," a bill of attainder,
and a violation of the due process clause because of vagueness. 41
This decision was reversed by the Maryland Court of Appeals on
the procedural ground that those who had challenged the Ober Act
under the State Declaratory Judgment Statute presented no jus-
ticiable case to the courts.42 Thus, as yet, on the question of the
inherent validity of this particular type of control measure we have
no authoritative ruling but only judicial "straws in the wind" from
the federal and sister state jurisdictions. Let us see where these
lead us in attempting to resolve some of the major issues surely
to arise in any future criminal prosecution in which the new Act
is invoked.
(i) The Problem of Federalism.
One of the arguments frequently advanced against state pro-
hibitory legislation of the sort considered here is that it operates
in a field that is or should be reserved to the national government.
This contention goes both to the necessity and the validity, under
our federal system, of such state efforts to guard the security of the
country from internal subversion. On the latter score of invalidity
as an encroachment upon a province exclusively entrusted to the
Federal Government under its power to provide for the common
defense43 the opposition's case would seem to be weak.44 It is true
that to the extent the state law and its administration is more
39 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 341 U.S.
56 (1951).
40 M. AmN. LAWS c. 264, § 15 (1951).
41 Lancaster et al. v. Hammond, Baltimore Circuit Court No. 2; Sherbow,
J., Daily Record (Baltimore), August 16, 1949.42 Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 71 A. 2d 474 (1950); Hammond v.
Franldeld, 194 Md. 471, 71 A.2d 483 (1950).
43 U.S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 8.44 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (state statute punishing ob-
struction of war effort upheld as exercise of concurrent power; Brandeis, J.;
dissenting).
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stringent than the federal program for internal security, the con-
duct of foreign affairs by the Government in a "particularly sensi-
tive international area" might be seriously embarrassed. 4 Yet the
right of the state to exercise its police power to protect itself is as
important to it as the same attribute of the Federal Government,
"and in the absence of any delegation of that right by the state
to the Federal Government it would still remain with it under the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. '46 Assuming that concur-
rent jurisdiction does exist, both sovereignties may punish the
same act or acts as criminal, and no defense of double jeopardy
will lie.47 Nevertheless, if it could be satisfactorily demonstrated
that state action herein conflicts with national policy with respect
to the regulation of Communist activities as evinced by Congres-
sional action in the field, the "supremacy" of the federal laws
would be held to forbid inconsistent state anti-subversive pro-
grams.48 It thus may be possible to argue that the Devine Act "con-
flicts" with federal policy as expressed in the Internal Security
Act of 1950, in that it brands mere membership as criminal. In
enacting the "McCarran Act" Congress rejected proposals to out-
law the Communist Party,40 choosing instead a policy of exposure
by requiring the registration of "Communist-action" and "Com-
munist-front" organizations." This choice was dictated partly by
the desire to avoid driving the Party underground, lest it avoid
police surveillance and public scrutiny.5 1 Prosecution by the states
for membership per se is certainly not calculated to further the
federal objective. Yet there is no clear indication that Congress
intended to "preempt the field" to the exclusion of state anti-
subversive legislation.5 2
45 Quotation from dissenting opinion in Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp.
635 (E.D. Mich. 1952). Suppressing Communists criminally here will detract
from our ability to criticize "iron curtain" countries for suppressing free
thought
4 6 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 172 Pa. Super. 125, 130, 92 A.2d 431 (1952).
47 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
48 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state statute requiring the reg-
istration of aliens held precluded by a subsequently enacted federal reg-
istration law).
49 HR. REP. No. 2980, 81sT CoNG., 2D. SEss. 5 (1950.
50 64 STAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786 (Supp. 1952).
51 See McCarran, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 12 U. OF Prrr. L. Rzv.
481 (1951).
52 Section 4(f) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 provides that "Neither
the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any
person shall constitute per se a violation of . . . this section or of any other
criminal statute. (50 U.S.C. § 783(f)-emphasis added). That this latter clause
applies only to the Smith Act (18 U.S.C. § 2385, par. 3) and not to state leg-
islation is arguable in view of its purpose to remove the Fifth amendment ob-
jection of compulsory self-incrimination. Possible incrimination under state
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But even if the division-of-powers argument is not likely to
be judicially accepted, one can question the practical wisdom of
establishing independently-operated state programs of this sort.
Certainly the local and state police are ill-equipped to engage in
the delicate work of counterespionage, and may do more harm
than good by effecting an untimely arrest which disrupts F.B.I.
plans for keeping tabs on a whole spy ring.53 Governor Lausche
in his veto of the Devine Bill disclosed that in the Spring of 1951,
a committee of seven governors of which he was chairman, acting
for the Conference of Governors, met with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
to discuss the problem of coordinating efforts against "sabotage
and communistic activities." After the Director of the F.B.I. and his
staff explained what the Government -was doing to keep under
surveillance "persons suspected of Communism," the Governors'
committee was of the unanimous opinion "that the problem should
be left completely and fully in the hands of the F.B.I. ' ' 54 Finally,
because it is inevitable that federal and state anti-subversive func-
tions will overlap, the state enforcement officers will be driven
to investigating matters involving no real threat to national secur-
ity but comprising only heretical utterances or behavior out of
conformity with current conventions. The danger this type of
thought surveillance will pose to uninhibited individual expression
need hardly be elaborated.
(ii) Non-organizational offenses.
Section 2921.22 (B) of the Revised Code creates the crime of
"knowingly and willfully" advocating, abetting, advising, or teach-
ing by any means "any person to commit, attempt to commit, or
assist in the commission of any act intended to overthrow... or
alter or to assist in the overthrow,... or alteration of the constitu-
tional form of the government... by force, violence or other un-
lawful means, under such circumstances as to constitute a clear and
present danger to the security of the United States or of this state."
To actually commit, or attempt to commit "such acts" as those
whose advocacy is forbidden, is also made punishable under any
circumstances by subsection (A). In contrast with the Federal
law is no ground for claiming the federal privilege in a federal proceeding.
See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). But cf. United States v.
DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D.Ohio 1952).
53 See Lowenthal, The Federal Bureau of Investigation 439 (1950). The
federal agency might also be forced to sacrifice some of its underground in-
formants -if they are picked up unknowingly by state enforcement officers.
To secure their release would obviously destroy their continued usefulness as
counter-spies.
S4 Veto Message on H.B. No. 308, cited supra, n. 25. For a more detailed
discussion of some of the problems raised in this subsection, see Note, State
Control of Subversion: A Problem in Federalism, 66 HAv. L. Ruv. 327 (1952).
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Smith Act,SS a conspiracy to so advocate is not expressly denounc-
ed,"o but practically identical group conduct could probably be
reached under the organizational features of subsection D, which
utilizes the new concepts of "subversive" and "foreign subversive"
organizations hereafter discussed. The Maryland "Ober" Commis-
sion apparently tried to improve on the language of the Federal
Sedition Law, which at the time the pattern for the present state
law was concocted, had not yet been tested in the United States
Supreme Court.57 A comparison indicates two essential differences
insofar as non-group criminality is concerned.
First, the Smith Act, patterned after the old New York "crim-
inal anarchy" law, prohibits individual advocacy of the "duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety" of forcible overthrow (an
idea or doctrine), while the Ober-type law speaks only of advocacy
of acts intended to assist in forcible overthrow. If the "acts" being
advocated were restricted to substantive violations of the criminal
code, such as espionage, sabotage, destruction of property, or as-
sassination, the verbal change would have the beneficial effect of
clarifying the foggy distinction under the Smith-type law between
"discussion" of the revolutionary teachings of Marx, Lenin, and
S 62 STAT. 608 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1948).
56 Subsection (C) of section 2921.22 creates the crime of "knowingly and
willfully" conspiring to commit an act intended to assist in forcible overthrow
of the government. Advocacy of such "acts" is denounced in a separate but
parallel subsection. Technically speaking, there being no general conspiracy
section in the Ohio criminal code, it would not be possible under this Act
to prosecute for the same offenses as in the federal Smith Act trials, viz., con-
spiracy to advocate, etc., and conspiracy to organize a group of persons who
advocate, etc. The difference between the national and state acts, however,
may be purely verbal as participation and membership in a "subversive"
group probably comprehends at least conspiring to talk and publish certain
ideas at a later date and "assisting in the formation" of a group which when
organized will have as one of its purposes the forbidden advocacy will in most
instances be indistinguishable from conspiring to organize such a group. If
there is any doctrinal difference in the latter case it is between criminal con-
spiracy (merely a joint plan) and a criminal attempt to organize an as-
sembly of persons who advocate overthrow by force and violence, viz., only
the federal law reaches "preparation" by two or more persons to organize a
"subversive group." Procedurally, the Smith Act prosecutions may be facili-
tated by invocation of the general conspiracy section (18 U.S.C. § 371) instead
of the substantive provisions, in view of the peculiarly hospitable rules of
evidence which then come into play. See Holman, Evidence in Con.piracy
Cases, 4 AusT. L. J. 247 (1930).
57 See Report of Commission on Subversive Activities to Governor Lane
and the Maryland General Assembly (Jan., 1949), hereafter cited as Mary-
land Report. The Federal Sedition Act as applied to the top leaders of the
American Communist Party was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
a decision handed down June 4, 1951. Dennis et al. v. United States, 341 US.
494 (1951).
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Stalin, and "advocacy" of them. 8 For the fact that the utterance
sought to be punished contained some reference to a particularized
wrongful act useful in facilitating forcible overthrow is some safe-
guard against confusing "seminars in political theory" with counsel-
ing in crime. But the unrestricted statutory term acts could con-
ceivably also cover constitutionally protected incidents of free
speech, press, assembly, such as contributions and membership.
Construed so broadly, however, the section would probably be held
unconstitutional on its face since it is not "narrowly drawn to
cover the precise situation giving rise to the danger."5 9 Further-
more, the judicial adoption of such an interpretation seems doubt-
ful in view of the appendage of the First Amendment "clear and
present danger" test 0 to only the advocacy and teaching proscrip-
tion, thus indicating an intentional discrimination between speech
and non-speech conduct, and the usual presumption that the legis-
lature did not intend to infringe upon protected freedoms.61
The term acts thus must mean physical overt acts of an inde-
terminate character with respect to legality.62 If the particular
5 8 
"The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an in-
citement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result."
Holmes, J., dissenting in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1952); "If
one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to
resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause
its violation." Hand, L., in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535
(S.D.N.Y., 1917); "It is true that there is no divining rod by which we may
locate 'advocacy.' Exposition of ideas readily merges into advocacy." Frank-
furter, J., concurring in Dennis v. United States, supra n. 57, p. 521. And see,
Antieau, Dennis v. United States-Precedent, Principle or Perversion? 5
VAND. L. REv. 141, at 148 (1952).
S9 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Cf. § 4(a) (2) of the Mundt-
Nixon Bill, HR. 5852, 80T. CONG., 2D. Srss. (1948): "It shall be unlawful for
any person to perform or attempt to perform any act with intent to facilitate
or aid in bringing about the establishment in the United States of a [ed.
foreign-directed] totalitarian dictatorship"6o Formulated in the World War I Espionage Act (50 U.S.C. § 33) cases
as a test for the sufficiency of the evidence where speech was used as proof
of an "attempt" to obstruct recruiting and enlistment and cause insubordi-
nation in the armed forces. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
61 See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120 (1948). Note, Su-
preme Court Interpretation of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53
CoL. L. REv. 633, 644 (1953).
62 Even if the term "acts" is judicially narrowed so as to exclude con-
duct protected under the First Amendment, it might be argued that the
existing proscription violates due process for excessive vagueness. But it
has been recognized that the vices inherent in vagueness are minimized if
a culpable mental state is an element of the conduct which the statute pro-
scribes. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,101 (1945); Gorin v. United
States, 312 U.S. 19 (1943).
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acts alleged to have been committed, attempted, aided and abet-
ted, conspired over, advocated, advised or taught had already an
unlawful character under the common law or criminal code, con-
duct falling short of direct consummation could in most instances
be punished, though frequently not as severely, without the new
statute under the traditional doctrines of incitement, solicitation,
accessoryship, criminal attempt and conspiracy. 6 3 In a case, for ex-
ample, of solicitation by A of B to commit false swearing in taking
a loyalty oath, the only effect of the new sedition law is to enhance
the penalty to twenty years imprisonment if it can be proved that
A's motive in so counseling B was to assist in capture of the ex-
isting government through the process of infiltration. On the other
hand, the particular acts relied on by the prosecution might not
independently constitute substantive violations, so that the question
arises whether the objective behavior contemplated may be of any
sort, no matter how trivial. If the scope of this key term is limited
solely by First Amendment considerations, then almost any vol-
untary series of bodily movements, no matter how innocuous seem-
ing- like the posting of a letter, traveling from one point to anoth-
er, or the selling of an automobile 64 -is made criminal if accompani-
ed by the requisite revolutionary purpose. According to this view,
practically everything a good Communist does during his waking
hours is within the reach of subsection A.65
That such an unnecessarily expansive interpretation would
work absurd results, and hence is not likely to be adopted, can
be shown by taking the case of a lone Trotskyite, unorganized
and clearly not part of the present Soviet world conspiracy. To
him the overthrow of capitalism and its replacement by "dictator-
63 On the common law crime of "solicitation," see MVcHATL & WECHSLER,
CRIIAL LAW AND ITS ADmINSTRATION 605-612 (1940). As Ohio does not rec-
ognize the common law of crimes, such a limitation to "acts" previously pun-
ishable by statute might result in an inability to prosecute for certain harm-
ful conduct, performed or counselled with revolutionary intent Sabotage
and rebellous riot, however, could be reached, OHIo REv. CODE § § 2923.13, 3761.13
(1953). As to conduct heretofore defined by the legislature as criminal, e.g.
perjury, bribery, assault, malicious injury to property, kidnapping, the new
sedition law proscribes the "inchoate" crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and in-
citement when engaged in for the designated revolutionary purpose.
64 Cf. Alger Hiss, convicted perjurer, according to his accuser Chambers,
transferred his old roadster to a Communist-run used car lot so that it could
be of use "to some poor organizer in the West or somewhere." See United
States v. Rosen, 174 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1949). It is conceivable that under a
liberal interpretation of the new state law, such an innocent-seeming act
would be equally criminal with the extraction of secret state documents.
65 "We must train men and women who will devote to the revolution, not
merely their spare evenings, but the whole of their lives." Quotation from
LE wN oN ORGANIZATION (1926) in GITLow, THE WHOLE or THEm LIvEs (1948).
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ship of the proletariat" is a consummation devoutly to be wished.
But no matter how much we personally detest his beliefs and ob-
jectives, to punish him for any act he performs which to his mind
hastens the coming of the Marxist millennium, without regard to its
actual harmful consequences or its mischievous tendencies due to
surrounding circumstances, comes perilously close to making a mere
mental condition criminal.6 6 It is submitted that, even though the
free speech principle be not involved in the prohibition of most
forms of activity, procedural "due process" might as a minimum
require for conviction proof of acts which evince a seditious design
on their face and tend toward the accomplishment of violent gov-
ernmental overthrow.67 The purpose which would be served in con-
sidering insufficient the proof of commonplace or insignificant con-
duct with covert revolutionary intent, is not the protection of
genuine subversives but the prevention of miscarriage of justice
as the result of perjury, passion, or inadequate evidence. Convic-
tion of the crime of treason requires no less, and for reasons which
hold equally for the present offense of seditious activity."8 Thus
66 To the extent that the required "overt act" is consistent with non-
criminality, the mental element or mens rea increases in importance. If in-
dividual crime (as contrasted with conspiracy) becomes predominantly sub-
jective, the traditional reasons for requiring proof of the actus reus are de-
feated. These reasons are: (1) The aim of the law is not to punish sins but
to prevent certain external results; no certain external results can be as-
signed to mere mental states. (2) Belief cannot be deterred by legal threats.
(3) Proof of a violation becomes too speculative where the outward mani-
festation is not indicative of the intent behind it. (4) If the power of gov-
ernment over beliefs is as unlimited as its power over conduct, "the way )s
open to force disclosure of attitudes on all manner of social, economic, moral
and political issues." (Jackson, J., dissenting in American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,402 (1950)). See generally, Hitchler, The
Physical Element of Crime, 39 Dicm. L. Rv. 95 (1935).
67 Cf. Proctor v. State, 15 Okla. 338, 176 Pac. 771 (1918); People v. Bel-
castro, 356 1l. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
68The crime of treason under both state and federal law consists of two
elements: adherence to the enemy; and rendering him aid and comfort. Oslo
REv. CODE § 2921.01 and 18 U.S.C. § 2381. The Federal Constitution, Art. III,
section 3 provides: ". . . No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on
the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court." It is now settled that the requirement of an "overt act" is not
met by proof of "a step taken in execution of the traitorous design, innocent
in itself, and getting its treasonable character only from some covert and un-
declared intent." Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945). See description
of the overt acts held insufficient in United States v. Robinson, 259 Fed. 685,
690 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
Another helpful analogy, though not nearly so close as treason, may be
found in the theory of preparation and attempt to commit felonies. See HALL,
PRInCIPLeS or Cpmim LAw c.4 (1947). The method of proof of the seditious
acts could of course be entirely circumstantial as contrasted with the ancient
two-witness principle in treason trials.
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in the field of organized labor, a strike called for legitimate trade
union objectives should not be branded criminal under the Act be-
cause of hidden disloyal motivations but a strike manifestly "politi-
cal" in character with such motivations could be. Only where the
objective facts confirm the existence of the alleged criminal intent
is it safe to hazard a man's liberty on the outcome of jury deliber-
ation. It is true that a wholly innocent "overt act" suffices to com-
plete the crime of conspiracy, but there the plot itself is the sub-
stantive evil and the requirement of some "overt act in further-
ance" of the common scheme only accords a season of repentance
before criminality attaches. 69 To apply the same low standard of
proof to trials of individuals, acting without conspiracy, while it
would facilitate enforcement of the Act against members of dis-
sident minorities, could establish a dragnet for the non-dangerous
radical, and run counter to some of our most cherished concepts of
criminal jurisprudence.70
Secondly, the Smith Act of 1940, following the majority hold-
ing in Gitlow v. New York 7l makes no reference to the require-
ment of proof of imminent danger that the indicted utterances will
produce a harmful effect, while the Devine Law specifies the "clear
and present danger" limitation in the advocacy section itself.72 The
reason for this modification was probably the recognition by the
Maryland Commission that the Holmes and Brandeis dissents were
69 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1945); Rlabinowich v.
United States, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1914).
70 The question discussed here is not made entirely academic by the
presence in the statute of sanctions against leaders and members of sub-
versive groups. For even if it be assumed that the state at present will only
proceed against persons actively engaged in the Communist movement, proof
of actual membership (not sympathetic association) may be hard to come by
or a "front" group may have so concealed its true aims that an adjudication of
its subversive character would not be sustained. If hypothetical defendant
X cannot then be convicted of forbidden organizational activity, discussed
infra, he may be charged instead, say, of attempting a seditious act under sec-
tion 2921.22 (A). Suppose the "act" chosen by the prosecutor is the securing
of a government job in an atomic energy installation. The position, if ob-
tained, would give access to classified information or opportunity for sabo-
tage come some national emergency. X might have applied for the job quite in-
nocently but the state expects to show that he sought the job in order to
assist in governmental overthrow when circumstances permit. X's state of
mind therefore becomes crucial, and consequently any radical reading or
private talking becomes relevant. Human behavior being as complex as it
is, a jury could only conjecture whether a seditious design necessarily fol-
lowed from the holding of certain unpopular beliefs.
71268 U.S. 652 (1925).
72 OMo REV. CODE § 2921.22 (B) (1953).
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bearing fruit in recent Supreme Court majorities.73 Nevertheless,
it would appear from recent Smith Act decisions in the federal
courts that although the Holmesian formula prescribing permissible
regulation of expression has survived in transfigured guise,74 this
judicial measure of constitutional applicability need not be actually
referred to or recited in the statute.75 Procedurally, however, the
effect of writing the test into the law is to make it an element of the
offense whose presence must be found by the jury as a condition
of guilt. This is contrary to the present practice in the federal
courts of treating the application of the test as a matter of law. 76
Because of the foregoing modifications, some of the literal
similarities between the state and federal sedition laws may be
more apparent than real. Thus, in line with the Smith Act, the
state law requires that the advocacy and teaching of the commission
of the forbidden acts be done "knowingly and willfully." The
United States Supreme Court in its opinion affirming the conviction
of the eleven first-string Communist leaders, felt compelled by con-
73 The gradual erosion of the Gitlow case rule, followed by the majority in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), which rendered inapplicable the
Holmesian "clear and present danger" test when the legislative body has by
statute determined that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of
substantive evil that they may be punished, is described in Boudin, "Sedi-
tious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present Danger" Rule, 38 VA. L. Rxv.
143, 165-177 (1952).
74 See Note 88, infra.
75 The Smith Act has been held "separable" in the sense that it may be
judicially limited to those situations to which it can constitutionally be ap-
plied. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515 (1951) and lower court
opinion, 183 F.2d 201, 214 (1950). If the free speech test is incorporated in
the statute in haec verba no harm is done, however, as the statute is not
thereby rendered more vague in its standard of guilt. Moreover, as an in-
dication of legislative intention, it is superior to a formal separability clause
in unequivocally drawing the line beyond which the statute may not legally
be applied.
76 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 512-515 (1950). The manner in
which the issue was handled in prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917
would be similar. Thus, in Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 483 (1919),
it was said: "The question whether in a particular instance the words
spoken or written fall within the permissible curtailment of free speech is,
under the rule enunciated by this court, one of degree. And because it is
a question of degree the field in which the jury may exercise its judgment is,
necessarily, a wide one. But its field is not unlimited. The trial provided for
is one by judge and jury; and the judge may not abdicate his function. If
the words were of such a nature and were used under such circumstances that
men, judging in calmness, could not reasonably say that they created a clear
and present danger that they would bring about the evil which Congress
sought and had a right to prevent, then it is the duty of the trial judge to with-
draw the case from the consideration of the jury; and if he fails to do so, it
is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error."
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stitutional doubts to construe this common phrase to mean with
the specific intent "to cause the overthrow of the Government by
force and violence as speedily as circumstances permit. ' 77 Because
the Devine Act denounces advocacy and teaching of revolutionary
acts, as contrasted with doctrines, its literal scope is probably less
broad than the federal law, and hence such a straining of ordinary
English may not be necessary in order to avoid a collision with
First Amendment guarantees. Let us assume for illustration that
the necessary evidence of violation of any of the criminal provisions
of the state sedition law shows not the dissemination of Marxist-
Leninist dogma, nor the organization of people to teach and advo-
cate it, but the teaching and advocating of "techniques of sabotage,
the assassination of the Governor, the filching of documents from
public files, the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and
the like."78 If proof of conduct of this sort alone satisfies the ap-
parently more exacting demands of the Ober-type enactment, then
because we are out of the realm of hawking ideas, the terms
"knowingly and willfully" may be accorded their normal meaning.
Moreover, there is no need in the Devine Act to smuggle in a
77341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951). See instructions to the jury by District
Judge Medina in United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
This reading of the first and third paragraphs of the Federal Sedition Act so
as to require proof of this specific intent, plus incitement to action in order
to give effect to Party doctrine, though somewhat forced, was felt to be
necessary to avoid constitutional objections arising from the bald terms of
the law which forbid teaching of a doctrine. Some commentators have argued
that this in effect makes the charge one of conspiracy to overthrow the
government by force and violence (punishable under the Conspiracy Act of
1861, 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1948), with which the top Party leaders were not
charged, and to sustain which no proper evidentiary basis was laid. Nathan-
son, The Communist Trial and the Clear and Present Danger Test, 63 HARv.
L. REv. 1167, 1172 (1950); Boudin, op. cit. supra note 73 at 324; Rostow, The
Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HA1v. L. R v. 193,219 (1952). Sub-
sequent Smith Act indictments may as a matter of "due process" have to be
drawn differently so as to allege the requisite intent. See United States v.
Schneiderman 102 F. Supp. 87, 97 (S.D. Calif., 1951).
7 S Douglas, J., dissenting, Id. at 581. The point is made therein that the
Dennis case transcript of evidence is lacking in proof of any such conduct.
If such facts were evidenced, free speech protection would depend on the
nature of the relationship betwen advocate and audience. Teaching the tech-
niques of revolutionary warfare to a group of devoted disciples who have al-
ready agreed to attempt violent overthrow when the time is ripe, is scarce-
ly distinguishable from a band of professional bank robbers giving lessons to
its neophytes in the art of safe-cracking. But advocacy of political reform by
unlawful means to an audience that must be convinced of the desirability of
a violent change before they will join the seditious conspiracy falls with-
in the ambit of protected utterances. In the latter case, government must
stay its hand unless and until there is imminent danger that some convert will
sally forth to action under the influence of the exhortations.
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specific intent requirement through statutory terms ordinarily
denoting a general intent, as the act or activity to be taught or
advocated must in all cases be "intended to... assist in the over-
throw... of government... by unlawful means." The existence
of such an intent on the part of the advocate obviously negates
the possibility of ignorance or good faith, so that the terms "know-
ing" and "willful" in the state law are either somewhat redundant
or take on significance only when the act whose commission is ad-
vocated was "intended" by someone other than the advocate to
assist in a violent coup d'etat.
The term "advocacy" or "teaching" as used in any sedition
statute obviously does not mean mere academic discussion of revo-
lutionary doctrine and techniques without some provocation to
unlawful conduct, whether remote or immediate.7 And this is so
even though "every idea is an incitment" in the sense that per-
suasion may create a desire for action. 0 What is constitutionally
punishable is instigation of the hearer to unlawful acts under such
circumstances that the unlawful acts will probably be attempted
before public discussion can furnish the corrective of countervail-
ing ideas.8 1 Whereas the legal concept "incitement" connotes an
immediate call to wrongful action, "advocacy" implies conversion
of belief in preparation for future acts of violence. s 2 Immediacy of
79Because this distinction between advocacy and interchange of ideas
may be largely subjective and hence subject to misuse by a jury, the Su-
preme Court will probably demand that trial courts find as a fact that the
"advocacy and teaching" involved "be of a rule of principle of action and by
language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such
action." Id. at 502.
So See supra note 58.
81See Rutledge, J., in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 101(1947): "The
Utah statute was construed to proscribe any agreement to advocate the prac-
tice of polygamy. Thus the line was drawn between discussion and advo-
cacy... . The Constitution requires that the statute be limited more nar-
rowly. At the very least the line must be drawn between advocacy and
incitement and even the state's power to punish incitement may vary with
the nature of the wrong induced, whether violent or merely offensive to the
mores, and the degree of probability that the substantive evil actually will
result."
82 See Brandeis, J., in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927):
.But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not
a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of in-
citement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be im-
mediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement,
between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be
borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it
must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or
was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that
such advocacy was then contemplated."
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anticipated evil is only essential where a substantial delay be-
tween utterance and its execution may "check its effect and change
its importance. 8 3 It has been argued that because present-day
Communism cloaks its real beliefs and directives in peaceful-
sounding language, the Miltonian view of truth as "that idea which
can get itself accepted in the free competition of the market-place"
is inapplicable to problems of control.8 4 In any event, it is still clear
that immunity from punishment extends not only to peaceful
criticism of our laws, but also to the advocacy, no matter how
radical, of change by legal processes of our basic institutional
structures.8 5
As the Devine law denounces individual advocacy of the com-
mission of the forbidden acts "by any means," the question arises
as to what besides speeches, writings, or conversations urging
violence to achieve political change, it embraces. Monetary gifts
to a "subversive organization" to be used for urging its doctrines,
and leadership in the organization of such a group might reason-
ably be said to be covered,"" but it is doubtful whether under the
usual canon of strict penal law construction, less conclusive non-
verbal conduct would suffice. An example of the latter, which may
be covered by other sections of the statute anyway, are financial
contributions to the general treasury of a subversive group, mem-
bership therein, or passive attendance at meetings.
(iii) Organizational Offenses.
83 L. Hand in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950).84 See Ernst and Katz, Speech: Public and Private, 53 CoL L. REv. 620
(1953). The authors suggest withdrawing First Amendment protection from
speech of a "clandestine" nature because of its slight social value. Their
argument is that public debate on controversial matters will be liable to restric-
tion if both secret and public utterances are lumped together for juridicial pur-
poses. This is an appealing contention to liberals who presumably would like
to find some such simple criterion as secrecy to distinguish themselves from
the Communists who have done them inestimable harm by masking their true
anti-liberal beliefs with humanitarian patter, thus creating confusion in the
public mind. Two exceptions might be taken, however, to the author's ap-
proach. First, secrecy is no true index of a criminal conspiracy, as legitimate
groups such as trade unions and splinter parties have historically
chosen to confer in secret. Second, although the covert type of
speech may be suppressed without much loss to "the thinking process of the
community," a silencing of all who resort to it will prevent them from
making public utterances as well which may have appreciable social utility.
85 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583,589 (1943); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927).
86 The Nationality Act provided that the "giving, loaning, or promising of
money or anything of value" to be used for advocacy shall constitute advo-
cacy. 54 STAT. 1141, 8 U.S. C. § 705 (1940). Cf. the superceding provisions of
the Immigration Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 166, 240 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § § 1101 (a) (2)
1424 (a) (SuPP. 1953).
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With respect to organizational activity, Sections 2921.22 (D)
and (E), and Section 2921.23 make criminal any participation or
membership in, or support of either a "subversive organization"
or a "foreign subversive organization" (both as defined in the Act)
with knowledge of its illegal character. With respect to the former
type of group, the new law does not differ much from the Federal
Sedition law except in the following matters. As discussed pre-
viously the forbidden "advocacy" under the state measure is not
of revolutionary doctrine but of revolutionary activities. Secondly,
the means intended to effect overthrow or alteration of existing
government may be merely unlawful, and need not, apparently,
be terroristic or violent.8 7 Thirdly, and possibly of greatest signifi-
cance, the mens rea in the newer act is expressed in terms of
knowledge that such organization is a "subversive organization,"
as contrasted with the less ambiguous Smith Act requirement of
knowledge of the unlawful purposes of the organization.
Neither the Federal nor the new state anti-sedition law limits
its application in so many words to organizational activity posing
a clear and present danger to internal security. This intentional
omission from the Ober-type law reveals a belief on the part of its
drafters that "criminal conspiracies" can be prohibited absent any
showing of "enough probability (of execution of the plot to over-
throw) to justify its suppression."88 It would logically follow from
such a legal conception, that any "subversive" group could be
dissolved and its members jailed, no matter how puny its re-
sources, how strong and well-advised the existing government,
and how stable domestic and world conditions. One looks in vain
for any warrant in United States Supreme Court decisions for
such a view,89 although it is true that Vir. Justice Jackson, in a
s7 The Maryland progenitor of the law used the series "revolution, force,
or violence." A. Amz. CODS § 85A § 1 (1951).
S8 Or, as phrased in another part of the Court of Appeals opinion, ...
whether the mischief of the repression is greater than the gravity of the
evil, discounted by its improbability." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
215 (2d Cir. 1950). See Maryland Report, p. 59.
39 As the Court has not as yet been given an opportunity to pass on
a conviction under the present type of law, our only source of guidance
is the Dennis case. At least seven of the Justices in that case held the "clear
and present danger" rule applicable to the sort of conspiracy there involved,
but differed amongst themselves as to its meaning.
Insofar as the affirming opinions can be brought into a single focus, they
declare that the systematic teaching and advocacy of revolution can be made
a crime, at least, and perhaps only, if the organization for spreading such
ideas is an aspect of a serious and potentially important attempt to attack the
Government by other means (e.g. Soviet foreign policy and military might).
The extension of free speech protection to the Smith Act defendants can
only mean that advocacy of revolutionary action by a group is not beyond the
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strangely ambivalent" concurring opinion in the Dennis case, ar-
gues the inapplicability of the free speech "rule of reason" to groups
engaged in the teaching or advocacy of force or violence and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in affirming the conviction
of the "second-string" Communist leaders tried in Baltimore
found it strongly appealing.91 Whether it will increase in judicial
adherents cannot be prophesied for all that can be stated with as-
surance at this point is that a substantial majority of the highest
constitutional court in the land will require for affirmance a ration-
al basis for a trial court's conclusion that violation of a sedition
statute shows sufficient danger to justify the punishment despite
the First or Fourteenth Amendment.92 And this extension of con-
stitutional protection to "subversive" groups will continue to make
sense as long as the sort of speech involved has any societal value
whatsoever. For today, as never before in the country's history,
it is only through joining militant organizations that the individual
can get his political views heard by the electorate and those in
authority. That even advocacy of overthrow of the Government by
force is not completely wanting in public interest was elequently
argued by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who though he concurred in
upholding the constitutionality of the provisions of the Smith act
as a reasonable exercise of Congressional power, doubted its ef-
fectiveness in combating Communism. He stated as follows:
pale. See supra note 77. On the other hand if the defendants had been in-
dicted for conspiracy to overthrow the government with force and violence,
no free speech issue would have arisen, but the historic distinctions betveen
criminal "preparations" and criminal "attempts" might have complicated the
prosecution. While proof of a violation under the Devine Law may be more
exacting in view of the substitution of seditious activity for seditious doc-
trines, the conspiracy which may be punished is still not one to attempt vio-
lent overthrow but an agreement to agitate for the public acceptance of
an illegal course of action in order to effectuate a revolution in government.
What we are still dealing with is discourse blended of varying proportions
of incitement to action and appeal to reason. Tolerance of such advocacy may
lead to our downfall but it is an article of our democratic faith that "no gov-
ernment which is worth preserving can be seriously endangered" by such
conduct. Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 75, at 1175. See also note 78.
9oId. at 562. "Ambivalent" in the sense that while judicial self-restraint
cautioned against denying Congress the power, the Justice is not only
alarmed over the growth of the conspiracy doctrine because of its high suscep-
tibility to abuse (see his concurrence in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 445 (1948), but expresses grave doubts concerning the "long-range ef-
fectiveness of this conviction to stop the rise of the Communist movement."
Id. at 578.
91 Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679, 683-684 (1952).
92 Vinson C. J., id. at 516: "Where there is doubt as to the intent of the
defendants, the nature of their activities, or their power to bring about the
evil, this court will review the convictions with the scrupulous care demand-
ed by our Constitution."
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"Of course no government can recognize a 'right' of revo-
lution, or a 'right' to incite revolution if the incitement has
no other purpose or effect. But speech is seldom restricted
to a single purpose, and its effects may be manifold. A
public interest is not wanting in granting freedom to speak
their minds even to those who advocate the overthrow of
the Government by force. For, as the evidence in this case
abundantly illustrates, coupled with such advocacy is criti-
cism of defects in our society. Criticism is the spur to re-
form; and Burke's admonition that a healthy society must
reform in order to conserve has not lost its force. . . It is
a commonplace that there may be a grain of truth in the
most uncouth doctrine, however false and repellent the
balance may be. Suppressing advocates of overthrow in-
evitably will also silence critics who do not advocate over-
throw but fear that their criticism may be so construed. No
matter how clear we may be that the defendants now be-
fore us are preparing to overthrow our Government at the
propitious moment, it is self-delusion to think that we can
punish them for their advocacy without adding to the risks
run by loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the
reforms these defendants advance. It is a sobering fact that
in sustaining the conviction before us we can hardly escape
restriction on the interchange of ideas." 93
In proscribing so-called "foreign subversive organizations"
and decreeing punishment for their members and supporters, the
Devine Act moves into an area where direct precedents are lacking
and the established constitutional landmarks seem to deny ingress.
A group of this sort is statutorily defined as an organization con-
trolled "directly or indirectly" by a foreign nation or group of
foreign nations which seeks to establish a puppet government in
the United States.94 The "World Federalists" and followers of
93 Id. at 549.
94 Omo Rzv. CoDE § 2921.21 (C): "'Foreign subversive organization'
means any organization directed, dominated, or controlled directly or in-
directly by a foreign government which engages in or advocates, abets,
advises, or teaches, or a purpose of which is to engage in, advocate, abet, ad-
vise, or teach activities intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter or to as-
sist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional form of
the government of the United States or of this state and to establish in
place thereof any form of government, the direction and control of which,
is to be vested in, or exercised by or under, the domination or control of
any foreign government, organization, or individual; but does not and shall
not be construed to mean an organization the bona fide purpose of which is
to promote world peace by alliances or unions with other governments or
world federations, unions, or governments to be effected through constitutional
means."
Cf. the statutory criteria in the Internal Security Act of 1950 for ad-
ministrative determination of whether a particular group is a "Communist-
action organization" for the purpose of registration with the Attorney-
General. 64 SrAT. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792(e) (Supp. 1952).
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Clarence Streit would seem to be exempted by a proviso forbid-
ding construction of the section to mean an organization "the bona
fide purpose of which is to promote world peace." But if the direc-
tives come from abroad and the domestic group pursuant thereto
agitates for subordinating state or national government to a
foreign prince or potentate by orderly discussion, by ballot, by the
established processes of lawmaking and constitutional amendment,
the statute is transgressed. And this is so under the Devine Act,
even though the form of government of the satrapy sought to be
substituted is intended to be as representative and democratic as
the British Dominions before Westminster.9 5 In contrast, the federal
Internal Security Act of 1950 created the new crime of conspiring
to perform any act which would contribute substantially to the
establishment of a foreign totalitarian dictatorship.96 Because re-
sort to violence or other illegal means need not be engaged in or
advocated for conviction, it would seem pretty obvious that both
statutes, and a fortiori, the former, sweep within their compendious
language protected incidents of free speech, press, and assembly.9 7
A goverment which protects itself from peaceful overthrow could
only do so by "rigged" elections if it lacks majority support among
the citizenry, and this characteristic we ordinarily identify with the
systems we hate. If this end-objective cannot then be prevented
by legal means under the constitution, how then can a "conspiracy"
to advocate it be made punishable? The draftsmen of the Ober law
95 But c. Shub v. Simpson, - Md. - , 76 A.2d 332, 338, 344 (1950), in-
terpreting the loyalty oath requirement for candidates for state office under
the Ober Act as meaning only that the affiant is not a member of an or-
ganization ("subversive organization" or "foreign subversive organization")
"of persons who are engaged in one way or another in the attempt to over-
throw the government by force or violence." The Mundt-Nixon Bill, H.R.
5852, 80m. CONG. 2D SEss. (1948) was much more cautious in condemning
only efforts to establish in the United States a totalitarian dictatorship, the
control of which would be exercised by a foreign power.
96 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783 (a) (Supp. 1952).
97Previous versions of the Internal Security Act, containing the same
language, were condemned by Messrs. John W. Davis and C. E. Hughes, Jr.,
writing letters to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in response to in-
vitations from Senator Wiley. Attorney General Clark (now Mr. Justice
Clark) wrote a similar criticism. Hearings before Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 5852, 8}TOn. CoNG., 2d SEsS. 415-425 (1950).
Such a statute could only be saved from constitutional attack by a ju-
dicial re-drafting which would go clearly counter to the intention of the
Commission which wrote the Maryland progenitor. See Maryland Report,
p. 33. Some courts have already attempted this emasculation. See Note 95,
supra. But the present section of the Devine Law, as it now stands, is void
on its face, as permitting within the scope of its language the punishment of
incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantees of free speech, press,
assembly, and petition. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1947).
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doubtless considered that it would be easier to prove that the
American Communist Party was run from Moscow than that it
had completely eschewed the use of constitutional means to gain
its end of governmental overthrow. 8 One can sympathize with the
desire to insure against Soviet domination of American society
without approving the means here employed. It certainly does no
credit to the American people to assume they would consciously
vote into office a puppet regime, and their awareness of alien
manipulation in political affairs seems reasonably assured by dili-
gent enforcement of the Federal Foreign Agents Registration Act 99
and the preservation of a free and unintimidated press. 00
In Section 2921.23 the new Act prohibits any person from be-
coming or remaining a member of either type of subversive or-
ganization "knowing such organization to be a subversive organi-
zation or foreign subversive organization." For some reason no
locus poenitentae was accorded Ohio subversives as it was by the
original Maryland statute which provided a ninety day period after
the effective date during which individuals and organizations
could change their minds and charters, and the former withdraw
if investigation showed their group to come under the ban.'0 ' Mere
98 See Maryland Report, p. 33: "This distinction (between 'subversive' and
'foreign subversive' organizations) is made because there are organizations
for example, the Communist Party, which for good reasons are suspected of
being dominated and controlled by a foreign government and of seeking
to overthrow the government of the United States and to replace it by some
form of government controlled by a foreign government, but which never-
theless contend that they no longer advocate forceful overthrow of our Gov-
ernment and are merely advocating the use of constitutional means to
achieve their end." (Emphasis supplied.)
Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 660 (1925):
"If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are des-
tined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way."
99 Since 1938, agents of foreign governments have been required to register
with the Attorney General and to label their propaganda. 52 STAT. 631-33
(1938), as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1946). See also the Voorhis Act of
1940, as to native para-military groups. 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (Supp. 1950). Gen-
erally, see Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The
Mfethod of Exposure, 10 U. oF Cr. L. REv. 107 (1943).
100 It has been argued that our form of Presidential Government, as
contrasted with the coalition-type governments overturned by the European
Communists, makes it "utterly impossible" for the American Communists
to gain power in this country by the process of out-witting our states-
men and using methods of cunning rather than open insurrection. Boudin, op.
cit. supra note 73, p. 346.
101 MD. ANw. CODE ART. 85A, § 3 (1951): "It shall be a felony for any
person after June 1, 1949, to become, or after September 1, 1949, to remain a
member, etc." See Maryland Report, p. 32. Compare the similar relief pro-
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membership is to be punished less severely than participation in the
formation or management of a forbidden group, but the absence
of any definition in the statute of what comprises membership
makes the distinction between it and "participation" and "contri-
bution in any way to the support" difficult of application. 0 2 Most
judicial signposts today point in the direction of constitutionality
of the provision, however. 0 3 It is true that the Department of Jus-
tice has so far seen fit to prosecute only the leaders of the Ameri-
can Communist movement, and then not for "membership" or ac-
tive participation in Party activities but for conspiring to willfully
advocate the necessity of forcible overthrow of the Government
and to organize the Communist Party as a society which so teaches
and advocates 04 Thus the federal courts have not had to pass on
the validity of a conviction solely under the membership pro-
visions for Communist organization members in the Internal Security Act of
1950. 52 U.S.C. § § 787, 788 (Supp. 1952).
102 Possibly a distinction between associating with a group and partici-
pating in its activities lies in purpose or motivation. The phrase "knowingly
and willfully" (discussed supra, note 77) does not qualify the proscription of
membership in Section 2921.23. If willfully is given its usual denotation as
"with an evil purpose" then an active member who knows his group is con-
sidered subversive but remains in for ulterior reasons (e.g. cheap insur-
ance, union shop protection, or a desire to attempt to turn the group to-
ward legitimate objectives) will not be visited with the more severe sanction.
103 It does not aid systematic analysis of the constitutional problem of
proscribing membership in certain groups by asserting them to be "con-
spiratorial" in nature. Even in wholly criminal operations, like operating an
illicit distillery, a distinction is traditionally drawn between those who fur-
nish supplies knowing that they will be put to unlawful use, and those who
make the venture their own, and "have a stake in its outcome." United States
v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir., 1940). Only the latter are "co-conspirators"
who will be bound by the wrongful acts of their confederates done in further-
ance of the scheme. Because the defendant in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927), although charged with membership in a syndicalist group,
was an organizer or leader in fact, it was probably proper to hold her re-
sponsible for the more incendiary manifestos of her colleagues. This does
not mean that mere "privity" cannot be made punishable, but that the es-
sentially hearsay evidence which would be good against the top officials
would not necessarily be admissible against a member who had not actively
joined the "partnership in crime," though he knew of its existence and did
not withdraw his support.
104 Whatever the original intentions of the Department of Justice as to
a program "of extensive suits to prosecute members" (see Hearings on the
Department of Justice Appropriations before the Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, 81sT CONG. 2D SEss. 85-6 (1950)), the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950 holds that membership shall not constitute per se a violation
of "any other criminal statute" - manifestly a reference to the Smith Act
Supra note 53.
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visions of the Smith Act. 0 5 Whether they will uphold one coming
up from a state court will depend in large part on how broadly the
highest state court construes the statutory terms'0 6 and whether
the particular kind of membership involved in the application of
the statute constitutes a clear and present danger of an attempted
overthrow of the government. 0 7 Although one may question the
wisdom of going after the small fry with such heavy artillery, if
the membership clause is fairly interpreted it will not create "guilt
by association."' 08 Grave injustice might be done if passive mem-
bership alone in even the Communist Party is taken as the equiva-
lent of support of force and violence. 0 9 For though the Party be
truly as closely-knit and cohesive as it is reliably reported to be,
there must still be on the rolls the names of a few dupes, illiter-
10S In two of the Smith Act cases which have so far reached an appellate
court, "membership" was alleged in the indictments as an object of the con-
spiracy charged to violate the substantive provisions of the Act. Both the
Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal held this provision independently
valid. Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137, 143 (8th Cir., 1943); Frankfeld v.
United States, 198 F.2d 679, 683-4 (1952).
106 Because of present unpopularity of anything smacking of Commu-
nism, proof of membership in pro-Soviet groups will in most instances be
highly circumstantial. As membership cards have been destroyed (Ohio Re-
port, p. 31), only seizure of Party rolls or an admission in court would di-
rectly tend to establish the fact. Hence, the courts in applying Section 2921.23
will have to determine what evidence will be sufficient on this issue. Incidental
parallelism of belief with some of the beliefs of those who direct the
policy of the Communist Party could not be punished. Cf. United States v.
Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507, 518-19 (D.C., D. of Col., 1953); Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380 (1927). Nor could innocent participation in a Communist-held
meeting where lawful discussion took place be made criminal by accepting
such datum as proof of membership. Cf. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258
(1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 358 (1936). Nor even highly in-
temperate criticism of our institutions or official actions. Taylor v. Mississippi,
319 U.S. 583 (1943).
107 Joining an organization, though an "overt act" in the objective sense,
is probably "an exercise of free speech and free inquiry." Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952). This would seem
to follow logically from the premise of the Dennis case, supra note 75, that at
certain times and places it is lawful to organize a group of persons who ad-
vocate forcible subversion of government. But even under present "Cold War"
clear and present danger, not all species of membership with guilty knowl-
edge pose the same danger to internal security. See Note, Conduct Proscribed
as Promoting VioZent Overthrow of the Government, 61 HAnv. L. REv. 1215,
1217, 1221 (1948).
10 See "Guilt by Association- Three Words in Search of a Meaning,"
17 U. oF Cii. L. RPv. 148 (1949). See also Hoox, HERESY, YES - CoNspmcy, No,
84 et seq. (1953).
109 See, e.g., State v. Boloff, 138 Ore. 568, 4 P.2d 326 (1931) (ditchdigger
joined because he heard the party was for the workers, convicted under mem-
bership clause of syndicalism statute although he was inactive).
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ates, and others, who while cognizant of its aims, may abhor force
or foreign domination but believe in the Party's social and economic
objectives.110 Membership per se in Communist "front" organiza-
tions is of course even more equivocal. Patent abuse of the law
can only be avoided in prosecutions under the "membership" clause
by requiring that the act or acts tending to prove membership "be
of that quality which indicates an adherence to or a furtherance
of the purposes and objectives of the proscribed organization as
distinguished from mere cooperation with it in lawful activities.
The act or acts must evidence a working alliance to bring the
program to fruition.""' As alluded to previously, it is difficult to
say what will be required as sufficient "knowledge." The Act's
language is subject to the interpretation that notice from some
official source, such as the Attorney General's list," 2 is enough.
No intimation is offered as to whether such notice need be actual
or constructive, although acceptance of the latter involves punish-
ing for mere ignorance or indifference. If actual notice from an
official quarter that some group to which one belongs is dominated
or has been infiltrated by Communists is held to suffice, the organi-
zation, even though it may have originated with lofty motives and
a loyal and honest staff, must be forsaken, for one will remain
behind at his peril." 3 While such an interpretation of the scienteringredient is conceivably valid, the relatively heavy penalty pro-
vided (up to $5,000 and/or five years' imprisonment) suggests that
the General Assembly was aiming only at members with personal
110 Cf. CHAFFm, FREE SPEEcH n TH= UmTm STATES 474-482 (1941). Wit-
ness Cvetic (Ohio Report, p. 65) thought there were hundreds of party mem-
bers who would like to withdraw but fear reprisal if they do.
" 'Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 143 (1944). This was the meaning given
the term "affiliation" in the deportation statute, because "we cannot believe
that Congress intended to cast so wide a net as to reach those whose ideas and
program, though coinciding with the legitimate aims of such groups, neverthe-
less fell far short of overthrowing the government by force and violence."
Though "affiliation" imports less than membership but more than sympathy,
the evidence on either issue would be similar.
1 2See infra, note 162. Such a listing for the limited purposes of the Fed-
eral Loyalty Program might be considered as giving some warning which
would cause a reasonably prudent innocent to investigate the nature of his
group. But being a purely hearsay declaration, "it has no competency to
prove the subversive character of the listed associations.' United States v.
Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir., 1951).
113 The lower court which found the Ober Act unconstitutional pointed
to a serious hardship that enforcement might inflict on members of labor
unions. If a union, found subversive because it was dominated by Commu-
nists, had a union shop agreement with employer X, the employees of X
would find themselves faced with the dilemma of either withdrawing with
loss of job, or remaining and risking conviction of subversion. See supra, note
42.
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knowledge of the unlawful purposes of the group.
(iv) Evidentiary Problems in Suits Against Subversive Groups.
The principal evidence used to prove subversive advocacy by
organizations has been the official and unofficial literature issued
or distributed by the association concerned. Articles appearing in
party periodicals bear a sufficient imprint of organizational adop-
tion to be admissible evidence against it." 4 The holding of secret
classes in revolutionary doctrine and technique, and the use of
party aliases and other subterfuges, attested to by ex-members and
secret police agents, has been used as proof of conspiratorial prep-
aration for action. 1 5 Expert testimony on communist theory and
practice is also admissible.116 But there seems to be no short cut
to a judicial determination that the Communist Party of the United
States has as its objective the seizure of existing government by
force and violence "as speedily as circumstances would permit."
Although legislative findings of fact as to the nature of the party
might be given some weight, the exercise of judicial notice of the
aims of subversive groups would seem unwarranted. 1 7 Communists
in court still vigorously deny that the use of "force and violence" is
114 See cases cited in Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1215, 1219 (1948). But cf.
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) as to the interpretation
to be accorded the "sacred texts" of the Party, written during a different day
and age but still cited as gospel by the faithful.
11s United States v. Foster, 9 F.RD. 367, 391 (S.D.N.Y., 1949).
16 Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679, 689 (4th Cir., 1952).
117 Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HaRV. L. REv. 269, 274 (1944). The Mary-
land Report cites at p. 102 nine federal court cases where judicial notice was
taken of this fact as so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dis-
pute. Whether these cases were rightly or wrongly decided, most of them
involved administrative deportation orders with consequently a relaxation of
the judicial rules of evidence. See Davis, Official Notice, 62 HAv. L. RPv. 537
(1949). Because a disputed matter has been decided one way in a number of
trials, it is not taken out of the realm of controversy so as to be subject to
judicial notice in subsequent litigation involving the same issue, but distinct
parties. The doctrine of res judicata, however, might be argued as a basis
for foreclosure of certain defenses in suits against individual members. If,
for instance, an organization after judicial hearing is determined to be sub-
versive under Section 2921.24, such finding might be argued in bar of re-
litigation of the general issues in individual trials. "Due process" would re-
quire at least all the safeguards of a "class suit" See Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S.32 (1940). This technique of severance of the general and particular is-
sues was used in the trials of the Nazi war criminals (see JACKSON, Tam
NURNBERG CASE 99 et seq.) but has not yet taken firm root in this country
(cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1943)).
After finding that an organization espouses the forbidden aims, the jury
or judge must also find that such activity imminently endangers some interest
the state can protect Supra, note 76. As to what extent notice may be
taken of the setting in world and national events, see Richardson, Freedom of
Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1951).
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any part of their program except as a defensive measure once the
proletariat has succeeded in securing power by constitutional
means. Thus while convictions under the Act are clearly possible,
its enforcement will not be easy. The Government in its first
petition under the Internal Security Act of 1950, charging the
Communist Party, U.S.A., with being a Communist-action organi-
zation, took over a year to present its full case to the Subversive
Activities Control Board.118 When these proceedings finally ter-
minate in the Supreme Court the Party may change its name or
even its true aims, thus causing the Government the trouble of
starting anew. It is well-known that the Government's Smith Act
prosecutions have been expensive, exhausting, and time-consum-
ing. Whether under present conditions, state enforcement will be
enthusiastically pushed seems doubtful when the possible benefits
are balanced against the time, energy, and judicial facilities that
will necessarily be absorbed. 119
B. Its Enforcement Provisions.
Most new criminal laws are left for their enforcement to the
traditional agencies of sheriff, urban police, city or county prose-
cutor, and grand jury. Within these familiar institutions there has
always been a very low degree of specialization with respect to the
nature of crime except where a metropolitan police force has seen
fit to set up a separate squad for the handling of violations occur-
ring in the fields of traffic regulation, narcotics, vice, and youthful
offenders. The formation of "red" squads to surveil the activities
of radical agitators and their hecklers is certainly not unknown. Yet
if a species of serious crime is of state-wide scope and is well-organ-
ized and conspiratorial in its methods it seems perfectly reasonable
to establish a central office to accumulate and maintain informa-
tion and to coordinate local counter-measures. The Kefauver Com-
mitte's hearings anent organized commercial crime gave impetus to
this administrative device, both in the form of "crime commissions"
11s 2nd Annual Report, United States Subversive Activities Control Board
(1952). Under New York's Feinberg Law (N. Y. LAws 1949 c.360) barring sub-
versives from the school system, the Board of Regents must hold hearings be-
fore listing any organization, membership in which will be prima facie proof of
unfitness to teach. The Regents, after the successful court fight, began hearings
on the subversive character of the Communist Party in March, 1952, which
were not concluded till June, 1953. During the third week of September, the
Board on the voluminous record decided the Party does advocate the doctrine
of violent overthrow. The case will now go back to the courts. N.Y. Times,
Sunday, September 27, 1953 2 E.
119 See, The States and Subversion (A.C.L.U., April, 1953) at p. 4 for
survey of recent action taken under the new flood of state laws. The Mary-
land attorney general "has displayed a marked reluctance to proceed in car-
rying out the provisions of the [Ober] law." Prendergast, op. cit supm note
34 at p. 167.
[Vol. 14
1953] CRITIQUE OF ANTI-SUBVERSIVE LEGISLATION 473
and increased centralization of law enforcement authority in the
state attorney-general. 120 The Devine Law, following the Ober
Commission's recommendations, adapts this technique to the prob-
lems of internal subversion. Section 2921.25 of the Revised Code
creates the new post of "special assistant attorney general" to in-
vestigate subversive activities and to assemble and deliver to the
approporiate county grand jury "all information and evidence" re-
lating in any manner to suspected violations of the new criminal
sections, heretofore discussed, "and relating generally to the pur-
poses, processes, and activities of any subversive organization or
foreign subversive organization." To implement his investigative
function, the special assistant, who is to be appointed and super-
vised by the attorney general, may employ such personnel as he
deems necessary, and may, in addition, call upon existing local
and state police authorities for information and assistance. Al-
though his access to the files of the F.B.I. is limited,121 he no doubt
will be able to cultivate common sources of information, such as
informants, the files of certain Congressional committees, and
sister state officials engaged in the same type of police work. Al-
though the various judges of the courts of common pleas, spontan-
eously or at the prompting of the local prosecutor, can initiate
grand jury investigations into subversion, the special assistant
attorney general may participate to the extent of testifying to
matters within his special competence, examining any witnesses
summoned, and subpoenaeing additional witnesses. So far we are
still in the realm of accepted machinery of law enforcement. But
the Act prescribes a marked divergence from traditional func-
tions when it imposes upon the grand jury "the direct obligation
to investigate and report upon 'Communism"' and imposes on the
new special assistant attorney the obligation to print, publish, and
distribute such grand jury reports on "Communist subversion."' 22
The various county grand juries under the aegis of the new state
official thus are intended to take over the functions of public edu-
cation and exposure in and of Communism when these are relin-
quished by the expiring Ohio Un-American Activities Commission.
Whether this sort of role can be satisfactorily engrafted onto
the historic functions of the common law grand jury without per-
verting its basic purposes may well be questioned. Although a body
12 0 See Report of American Bar Association Commission on Organized
Crime, "Organized Crime and Law Enforcement," Vol. 1, p. 67 (Ploscowe ed.,
1952).
121 Such reports and official information are confidential and may not be
disclosed without the assent of the United States Attorney General. Depart-
ment of Justice Order No. 3229, 11 Fm. REG. 4920 (1946).
122 OHIo Rv. CODE § § 2921.25, 2921.26 (1953).
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possessing plenary inquisitorial powers, "the most valuable func-
tion of the grand jury is not only to examine into the commission
of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused,
and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible
testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will.'12 3 As
contrasted with legislative investigating conunittees, grand juries
must function in secrecy. In Ohio the jurors are admonished and
sworn to secrecy, as is the official shorthand reporter, and no un-
authorized person is allowed to intrude upon its hearings or de-
liberations.'24 The proceeding is strictly ex parte, with the pro-
spective accused accorded no right to present his defense or cross-
examine his accusers. The convening court will ordinarily only
permit inspection of the transcript of record by the accused after
indictment returned, and then only when the "interest of justice"
so demands. 12 5 The main purpose of all this secrecy is not alone
to avoid flight by the accused or to encourage freedom of action in
the grand jury room, but to protect the reputation of an innocent
accused from public knowledge that charges are being preferred
against him.126 It is false analogy to point to the duty of the jury
to investigate the condition of the county jail,'12 for the treatment
and disciplining of prisoners is a fairly objective phenomenon and
does not entail the assessing of imponderables in the area of politics
and personal belief. It is hard to conceive of a report on local Com-
munism couched in anything but the vaguest generalities that does
not "name names" of persons not yet indicted for crime.12 8 Even
the "un-American" committees which have been most maligned
123 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
124 Omo Rsv. CODE § § 2939.06, 2939.07, 2939.10, 2939.11 (1953).
12S State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910).
126 See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE FRO.i ARREST To APPEAL 171 et seq.
(1947).
127 Maryland report, p. 36. Cf. OHIo REv. CODE § 2939.21 (1953).
128 The courts have allowed an aggrieved subject of a grand jury report
several remedies. If the jury has acted outside the ambit of its authority
a motion to expunge will be granted. Hayslip v. State, 249 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn.,
March 7, 1952); In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 89 A.2d
416 (N.J., June 16, 1952). Under Section 2921.27 of the present enactment,
if the Ohio Attorney General permits disclosure of damaging innuendo, a
motion to expunge would probably not lie, and hence, no suit for libel would
be entertainable against the members of the jury. Cf. Rector v. Smith, 11
Iowa 302 (1860). But even if the report is not held privileged, newspaper
re-publication may constitute "fair comment" and not be actionable. Par-
sons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913).
In the absence of a group libel law, a civil action can generally not be
brought for defamation of a "class" unless the individual can show that the
publication applies to him in a special way. See Note, 93 U. oF PA. L. RE7.
865 (1950). On whether the Communist label is defamatory per se, see Note,
11 OHIo ST. L. J. 577 (1950).
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by the liberal faction, have provided the victim of a public charge
of disloyalty the opportunity to appear and publically rebut.129
That this danger of irrevocably blasting innocent reputations
was recognized not only by the Devine Bill's opponents is seen
from the last section of the measure which forbids (with no sanc-
tion attached) the disclosure prior to indictment of any information
reflecting on the loyalty of any resident of the United States "ex-
cept with the permission of the attorney general."' 3 0 But skepticism
about the effectiveness of this exhortation seems justified in view
of the lack of any specified standards to control that official's dis-
cretion and the avowed purpose of the law's original drafters to
expose by grand jury report secret Communist Party members
"who are diligent in seeking to operate within the laws."' 3' Con-
ceding that prosecutions of the few persons who run afoul of the
laws is difficult for having to meet exacting standards of proof,
and even if successful are not alone sufficient to deal with the
menace, respect for American standards of decency and fair-play
would seem to counsel resort to methods of eliminating the under-
lying causes of Communist allegiance' 32 rather than letting accu-
sation of treachery stand for proof of guilt.133
V. The Hoffman Law, Excluding Subversive Persons from State
Employment.
Section 143.272 provides for the dismissal of any state em-
ployee, including teachers in the public schools and state-support-
ed colleges and universities, who either advocates unlawful over-
throw of the state or national government, or "willfully retains
129 Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee, 18 U. or Cs" L. REV.
598 (1951).
130 Osxo Rsv. CODE § 2921.27 (1953).
131 Maryland report, p. 36: "... . it is impossible to deal with the menace
only by prosecution of the few persons who run afoul of the laws... Con-
stant reports of the Grand Juries of this State, exposing secret activities,
identifying and indicting persons engaged in advancing the Communist con-
spiracies, describing the Communist 'line' as it may currently be, all based
upon evidence considered and weighed by a representative group of repre-
sentative citizens, will unquestionably inform the public accurately, properly
and forcibly."
13 2 As to why Americans become Communists, see ERNST AND Irm, RE-
PORT ON THE AmUmcAN CoMUNIST (1952).
133 Governor Lausche in his Devine Bill veto message, op. cit. supra note
25, stated: "Regardless of the sincerity of the Attorney General or the as-
sistants whom he hires to operate this separate agency of government, I can
see nothing but grave danger to the reputations of innocent people against
whom accusations can be made on the basis of rumor and frequently root-
ed in malice. I can see the reputations of innocent persons actually ruined
by rumors, doubts, innuendos, and guilt inferred through association, as we
are now witnessing nationally through unbridled and unharnessed public
investigations."
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membership" in an organization so advocating. No one can argue
with the manifest purpose of such a measure to deny the privilege
of state employment to those who seek the forcible overthrow of
existing government. And even though it is often argued that in-
ternal security does not require the extension of loyalty guaran-
tees to public jobs not involving trust, influence, or opportunity
for espionage, the irony of financially supporting through state
funds persons committed to the aid of a foreign power would tend
to justify an all-embrasive prohibition. Without regard to how the
Act may be administratively implemented, it is certainly safe, in
view of recent Supreme Court decisions,13 4 to consider it consti-
tutionally valid. As was recently stated: "City, State and Nation
are not confined to making provisions appropriate for securing
competent professional discharge of the functions pertaining to
diverse governmental jobs. They may also assure themselves of
fidelity to the very presuppositions of our scheme of government
on the part of those who seek to serve it."'135 The fact that the Act
in its enforcement might directly or indirectly operate to discour-
age the exercise of certain of the constitutionally protected free-
doms is not fatal where the means adopted bear a reasonable re-
lationship to a proper legislative purpose. 13 Because there is no
constitutional right to a position on the state payroll no showing
of imminent infiltration or threatened undermining of state func-
tions need be made to justify efforts to bar persons of inimical be-
liefs and inconsistent loyalties. Although under state civil service,
inquiry into political opinion or affiliation is forbidden,13 7 the gen-
eral attitude of the courts today is to interpret such provisions
as not intended to protect any individual or group advocating the
overthrow of the government by force or violence. 38
The Act by its terms applies to all public employees at both
state and local levels in both classified and unclassified civil serv-
ice. There is express inclusion of teachers in the public school sys-
tem and in state supported universities and colleges. Whereas in
the case of employees in the classified service of the state removed
for any of the hitherto specified causes,189 the decision of the civil
134 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). Cf. Adler
v. Board of Education, 342 US. 485 (1952).
135 Frankfurter, J., concurring in Garner v. Board of Public Works, Id. at
724.
136 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102-103 (1947).
137 Omo Rrv. CoD. §§ 143.16, 143.18 (1953).
138 Cf. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
28 Cal.2d 481, 485, 171 P.2d 21,24 (1946).
139 Omo R1v. CODE § 143.27 (1953): ... such officer or employee may be
removed for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral con-
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service commission is final, an appeal to the court of common pleas
"to determine the sufficiency of the cause of removal" is afforded
where the ground alleged is disloyalty.140 Judicial review of orders
of termination by the boards of education of teachers' contracts
has always been available. 141 Procedure for the removal of in-
structors and professors in the state universities is of course de-
termined by the appropriate board of trustees.142 Court review of
dismissals in this area could only be had by suing for breach of
the tenure and fair "hearing" terms of the academic contract.143
The extension of the availability of judicial review to all clas-
sified state civil servants implies a recognition of the dire con-
sequences visited upon a person excluded from public employment
on disloyalty grounds. Though not technically punishment, 44 such
a discharge may continue to impair his ability to earn a livelihood,
and inflict a lasting disgrace to the individual concerned.145 But the
granting of judicial review is a hollow boon if the fundamentals of
"due process" such as specificity of charge, confrontation, and cross-
examination of accusers need not be observed by the administrative
officials concerned. Important also is the standard of proof that
duct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty,...
or any other violation of the rules of the commission."
140 Only in the case of removal of a chief of police, or of a fire department,
or any member of either, does appeal lie as a matter of right from the de-
cision of the municipal civil service commission for dismissals on grounds
other than disloyalty. Where an appeal is taken to the court of common
pleas, the questions of removal must be tried de novo. Landrey v. Harmon, 5
Ohio App. 217, 39 Ohio C.C. 303 (1916).
141 Omo REV. CODE § 3319.16 (1953). The court appeal here does not
require a trial de novo, but the common pleas judge may supplement the
transcript and record of the hearing before the school board if deemed ad-
visable. A teaching contract may be terminated for gross inefficiency or im-
morality; for willful and persistent violations of reasonable regulations of the
board of education; or for other good and just cause.
142 Omo REv. CODE §§ 3335.09 (Ohio State University), 3343.06 (Central
State College), 3341.04 (Bowling Green State University; Kent State Univer-
sity), 3349.03 (Municipal educational institutions). Although no express
grant of the power to remove was made to the trustees of Ohio and Miami
Universities, it is assumed to be inherent. See §§ 3337.01, 3339.01.
143 Cf. State ex. rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939).
144 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C., CA., 1950). But cf. concur-
ring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 174 (1950) and majority rationale in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946).
145 Private employers are increasingly imposing loyalty standards on job
applicants and have frequently resorted to governmental "loyalty boards"
for information about grounds of discharge of an applicant. See Comment,
Loyalty and Private Employment: The Right of Employers to Discharge Sus-
pected Subversives, 62 YALE L. J. 954, 956 (1953).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
must be met to substantiate a dismissal of this kind,146 and the
quality of the evidence that can be admitted.147 As the Act is silent
on the question of procedural safeguards for verifying the charge
of forbidden advocacy or membership in subversive organizations,
the school boards and state and municipal civil service commis-
sions will have to spell them out by means of their rule-making
powers. 148
The Act is also silent as to means of implementation. This is
not uncommon in many states today having similar laws149 but it
leaves to administrative discretion the large and vital question of
how and in what manner the facts relevant to the charge are to be
ascertained. Should an affirmative effort be made by every state
agency to ferret out secret subversives or should the matter of de-
tection be left to chance such as newspaper or magazine reports
linking an employee with a subversive group or public hearings
featuring the employee as witness or defendant? Viewed objective-
ly, the answer would seem to depend not only on the amount of
Communist infiltration that has actually occurred in state govern-
146 Because the Communist Party is essentially an underground organiza-
tion, proof of membership can seldom be conclusively established unless the
evidence of confidential informants is obtained. As it is often officially claimed
to be infeasible to expose these informants to public examination, the agency
head must either forebear or proceed on essentially hearsay evidence which
may have only created a suspicion of disloyalty. The Hoffman Act, unlike the
corresponding sections in the Maryland Law (M.D. Am CODE ART. 85A, § 14)
sets up no standard of proof, like "reasonable grounds to believe," or "reason-
able doubt as to loyalty," so that the charge of present and personal advocacy
of forcible overthrow would at least have to be supported by "substantial
evidence." See Horowitz, Report on the Los Angeles City and County Loyalty
Programs, 5 STAN. L. 1Ixv. 233,242 (1953).
147 Rule XIII, § 6 of the Civil Service Commission provides that the re-
ception of evidence at such hearings shall be governed in general by the
rules applied by the courts in the trials of civil actions. The Commission's de-
cision is reviewable by trial de novo in the court of common pleas, thus seem-
ing to assure a full hearing in disloyalty cases. The various boards of educa-
tion are required by statute to take testimony under oath, allow cross-exami-
nation by counsel, keep a record of the proceedings, and issue subpoenas for
defense witnesses. Omo Rzv. CODE § 3319.16 (1953). The nature of the tenure
hearing accorded at the state universities is determined by each board of
trustees. At Ohio State University in Columbus, "termination for cause shall
only be accomplished by strict adherence to the procedures of due notice,
written charges, reasonable opportunity to reply, and a fair hearing, including
the right of representation and submission of evidence.. " Academic Appoint-
ments, Tenure, and Promotions (Appr'd by the Ohio State University Board of
Trustees, Oct. 15, 1951).
148 Omo REv. CODE §§ 143.13 (B), 143.30, 3313.20 (1953). And see supra,
note 142.
14 9 See THE STATES Am SuBvEsIox, Appendix A, pp. 407-8 (Gellhorn ed.
1952).
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ment and public educational institutions'50 but an assessment of the
risk of injury to the morale and efficiency of civil servants and
teachers'5 ' necessarily incident to an investigation into political
belief and affiliation. If in view of these factors and, in addition,
the unavailability of the necessary facilities and funds, a full-blown
state loyalty program is not administratively feasible,15 2 the most
popular alternative today is the device of the loyalty or test oath.
Though it seems doubtful that the actually disloyal would cavil at
taking it, its proponents argue that proof of false statements in
an affidavit will not only facilitate removal of suspected subver-
sives but may lay a basis for a perjury prosecution. 53 But aside
from the question of the wisdom of such measures, 1 54 their legal
and constitutional validity in Ohio today can not be assailed if
such oaths are couched in terms of a disavowal of present advocacy
of violent overthrow and knowing membership in groups which
engage in such advocacy 55 and a promise to forbear from such ac-
tion while in office.156 Even without the present statutory back-
ground, several state and local educational authorities have requir-
ed the taking of such an oath from both present and prospective
teachers, an action which was upheld in a lower court decision in-
volving the Cleveland Board of Education. 157 How much further
IS0 The Report of the Ohio Un-American Commission contains no findings
with respect to Communist infiltration of either state agencies or the public
school system.
151 In this connection see Jahoda and Cook, Security Measures and Free-
doa of Thought: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security
Programs, 61 YALE L.J. 295 (1952).
152 Ohio is the only state thus far which has adopted the criminal pro-
visions of the Maryland Ober Law while failing to enact its loyalty program
provisions. However, Los Angeles city and county have by exercise of admin-
istrative rule-making power established small-scale programs statutorily
based on Government Code provisions (CAL, GovT. CoDP §§ 1028, 13200) sub-
stantially similar to the Hoffman Law. See Horowitz, op. cit. supra at note 146.
New York has by statute set up an elaborate system of loyalty hearings and
investigations for teachers. See the analysis in Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485 (1952). The "Pechan" Loyalty Act of 1951 adopted in Penn-
sylvania is evaluated in Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101
U. oF PA. L. REv. 1-29 (1953). The forerunner of the state programs is of
course President Truman's Order of March 2, 1947 (Exnc. ORDER No. 9835, 12
FED. REG. 1935) which affected all federal employees. Its operation is critical-
ly discussed in BoNz cou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURT PROGRAMa (1953).
153 For the arguments pro and con, see Byse, op. cit. supra note 152 at 5-7.
15 4 See e.g., Stewart, THE YEAR OF THE OATr-Tan FIGHT FOR AcADEnc
FIiEmom &T THE UNIVERsITY OF CALIFORruA (1950); Tan STATns sm SuBmsvriS
c.4 (Michigan) (1952).
ISSGarner v. City of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
156 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
157 See Ihvorken v. Cleveland Board of Education, 42 Ohio Ops. 240, 94
N.E. 2d 18 (1950). On April 19, 1948, the Board of Trustees of Ohio State
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such test oaths can go in eliciting information considered germane
to a finding of disloyalty, such as singling out certain organizations
by name, incorporating certain official listings of subversive groups
by reference, and delving into past affiliations and actions, is still
an open question.158 It is clear however that the affiliation which
must be forsworn has to be, or have been, with knowledge of the
subversive aims of the group and cannot be innocent.1 9 To require
otherwise would be to penalize individuals for exercising the rights
of free speech and inquiry, for the oath could not be conscientiously
taken by any employee uncertain of the ends of groups with which
he is now or has in the past been affiliated and "is bound to operate
as a real deterrent to people contemplating even innocent associa-
tions."'u 0 Not only might a person be duped into joining a subver-
University prescribed the filing of an Oath of Allegiance for all officers, in-
structors, and employees. In addition to the traditional oath to uphold the
Constitution, University employees must forswear present and future advocacy
of violent overthrow of government and membership in any political party or
organization that does.
It is interesting to note that the General Assembly imposed a traditional-
type loyalty oath requirement on teachers in 1919 but repealed the law in
1935. OHro GEN. CODE § 7852-2 (1938). The Ohio Constitution, Art. XV, §
7 (implemented by O~ro R v. CODS § 3.23) requires of "public officers" an
oath to support the state and federal constitutions and of office. As the or-
ganic law does not forbid the imposition of additional qualifications, it is
doubtful that the constitutional oath is exclusive. Cf. Tolman v. Underhill, -
Cal. App. 2d -, 229 P.2d 447 (1951).
158 To the extent that a particular form of oath requires the disclosure of
present and past affiliations and beliefs it is a fact-finding mechanism and
not a pledge of future fidelity. Viewed as a compulsory questionnaire, its
validity will depend mainly on the relevency of the facts it seeks to elicit to
the statutory grounds for dismissal, viz., present and personal advocacy of
violent overthrow. If the oath or affidavit requirement is a valid one, refusal
to take it would be "insubordination!' independently justifying dismissal. Note
139, supra. Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment is no bar to inquiring
as to past or present membership in the Communist Party. Garner v. Los
Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1950). Similar inquiries with reference to
association with other groups such as suspected "front" organizations raises
difficult problems of "due process" if the determination of "subversiveness"
was made ex parte by some official and for limited purposes. Weiman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). The validity of such official action would
certainly be affected by whether a forced admission of membership in a sus-
pect group could be used as evidence in a dismissal hearing, and the weight
to be accorded the fact of membership in an adjudication of forbidden advo-
cacy. For the California practice, see Horowitz, op. cit. supra note 146 at pp.
238-9.
159 Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). (Oklahoma Supreme Court's
holding that guilty knowledge is not a factor held violative of due process).
160 Concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Garner case, Id. at 728: "How
can anyone be sure that an organization with which he affiliates will not at
some time in the future be found by a State or National official to advocate
overthrow of government by 'unlawful means'? All but the hardiest may well
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sive group but the character of the listed group might have been
legitimate when he affiliated or even after designation as subver-
sive have freed itself, at the time of his joining, from the disloyal
influences.
For purposes of removal for disloyalty the employee must be
found either to personally advocate overthrow of the existing state
or national government by unlawful means or to "willfully retain"
membership in an organization which does. The experience under
the Federal Loyalty Program indicates that should hearings be
held under the new Act main reliance will probably be placed on
the criterion of membership. 61 In such event the question of the
determination of whether a particular organization is subversive
or communistic will inevitably arise. A determination of this sort,
involving as it does the diverse aims of ofttimes large and complex
organizations, could not practicably be made at the removal hear-
ing itself, so that recourse is likely to be had to prior state or fed-
eral court adjudications or authoritative listings by attorneys gen-
eral or legislative investigating committees. Because proceedings
against an employee for disloyalty are administrative in character,
the limited use of such ex parte designations will doubtless be
countenanced by the courts.1 2 With regard to the weight to be
accorded such evidence, it must not be forgotten that even the
United States Attorney General's designations of organizations
"seeking to alter the form of Government of the United States by
unconstitutional means," were submitted to the Loyalty Review
hesitate to join organizations if they know that by such a proscription they will
be permanently disqualified from public employment These are considera-
tions that cut deep into the traditions of our people. Gregariousness and
friendliness are among the most characteristic of American attitudes."
161 "Not one single case or evidence directing towards a case of espionage
has been disclosed in the record... I say it is an extraordinary thing that not
one single syllable of evidence has been found by the FBI, efficient as they are,
indicating that a particular case involves a question of espionage .. .all of
these cases that we have had have had to do with this question of association,
affiliation, membership with organizations which have been certified by the
Attorney General to be subversive.' Chairman Seth Richardson of the Loyalty
Review Board testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings on State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. I, p. 409 (1950). See also on the indicia of disloyalty, Bontecou, op. cit
supra note 152 at c. IV.
162 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C., C.A., 1950), affd (by an equal-
ly divided court), 341 U.S. 918 (1950). However, if the individual is pre-
cluded from attacking the propriety of a group designation in his removal
hearing, the group itself as representative of all its members, is entitled to
notice and administrative hearing and judicial review before being charac-
terized as "Communist" Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1950). This practice is now being followed under Attorney General Brownell.
See U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 4, 1953, p. 42.
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Board with the caveat that membership in any named organization
"is simply one piece of evidence which may or may not be helpful
in arriving at a conclusion as to the action which is to be taken
in a particular case."'1 3 As a consequence of this limitation, a fed-
eral court of appeals has recently held that admitted present mem-
bership in the Socialist Workers Party is not alone sufficient for
discharge; the test is still individual disloyalty to the government.164
164 Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783 (D.C., CA., 1952)
As this involves finding the state of a man's mind it of course may
be proved circumstantially by considering "one's associates, past
and present, as well as one's conduct."'165 The nature of the evidence,
however, adduced at disloyalty hearings should not lead us to con-
fuse the method of proof with the ultimate fact to be proved. To
blur this distinction may not create "guilt by association" but runs
grave risk of injustice to innocent individuals.
VI. The Devine-Corrigan Law,166 Making Refusal to Answer Of-
ficial Inquiries into Subversion a Ground for Dismissal from
Public Office or Employment.
Section 143.271 provides that the fact that a public employee or
officer refuses to testify on the basis of the privilege against self-
incrimination concerning his membership in a subversive organi-
zation before a "duly authorized tribunal, or in an investigation
under authority of law" shall constitute "unfitness" of such per-
son for retaining his position under the state government. The
type of organization referred to is one which "advocates overthrow
of the government of the United States or of this state, by force,
violence or other unlawful means." The new law is clearly intend-
ed to extend to all persons on the public payroll, from Governor
to unskilled laborer, and seems to dispense with the necessity for
any notice or hearing, or opportunity for the urging of extenuating
circumstances. The sole operative fact being the act of the officer
or employee claiming his privilege against self-incrimination in
response to a particular question, there is probably no need for
provision for hearing, as the commission of such acts are usually
matters 'of public record or otherwise capable of ascertainment
beyond dispute.
The enactment of this law is obviously a legislative reaction
to the recurrent spectacle of witnesses, notably educators, pleading
the protection of the Fifth Amendment before congressional com-
163 5 C.F.R. § 200.1 (1949 ed.) (Quoting a statement by President Truman,
Nov. 14, 1947).
165S Minton, J., in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 488 (1952).
166 H.B. No. 575 becomes effective Oct. 29, 1953. The voting on it was as
follows: House - yeas 108, nays 13; Senate - yeas 22, nays 10. Bulletin, 100th
Gen. Assembly (20th ed., 1953).
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mittees engaged in the exploration and exposure of Communist ac-
tivities. Ever since the Kefauver crime hearings the nation at large
has undergone an extensive course of instruction in the history and
legal meaning of the self-incrimination privilege to the point where
the veriest moppet when interrogated by his mother relative to
pantry depredations sullenly justifies his refusal to "come clean"
with an invocation of the privilege. Ohio has had its own peculiar
experience of this phenomenon in the form of witness defiance of
both the state "un-American" commission1 67 and Representative
Harold Velde's (R.-ll.) House Committee which held televised
hearings involving Ohio residents both within and without the
jurisdiction. 68 An administrative precedent for the new general
measure can be found in the action of the Board of Trustees of
Ohio State University in the rulings incident to the removal in
May of 1953 of physics professor Byron T. Darling.0 9 Almost
identical cases and dispositions have occurred elsewhere in the
country during the last year or so,"70 giving rise to extensive and
impassioned public debate concerning not only the policy and
wisdom behind the constitutional privilege but its relation to
academic and personal freedom as well. Issuing out of these con-
troversies have come a number of differing answers to the ques-
tion of the significance to be accorded the claim of privilege in
the context of present international strife and domestic remobili-
zation. Perhaps the solution that comes the closest to the present
enactment is the section of the New York City Charter which
provides that public employment shall "automatically cease" upon
refusal of such employee to testify "regarding the property, govern-
ment or affairs of the city or of any county included within its terri-
torial limits" before either state, local or national authorities.' 71
167 See, e.g., supra note 26.
16S Columbus Journal, June 18, 1953, p. 1, col. 3.
169 At a hearing on March 13, 1953, before the House Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee in Washington, Darling declined on Fifth Amendment
grounds to testify under oath whether or not he was a Communist. Later
at his tenure hearing before the President of the University, he denied that
he ever was or had been a Communist. See opinions of the President and
Board of Trustees in 14 Ohio St. U. Faculty Review, May 1953, pp. 5-10.
170The Harvard Crimson of June 10, 1953 was devoted exclusively to a
report on "Education and the Fifth Amendment." According to this source,
as of June first of this year, "over 100 university teachers had declined to an-
swer questions on grounds of the Fifth Amendment. Fifty-four had been
dismissed or suspended from their jobs. Others were on probation or under of-
ficial censure."
171 New York City Charter, § 903 (1943). Cf. Philadelphia Home Rule
Charter, § 10-110 (1951), and La. Rev. State. tit. 33, § 2426 (1950). For a
comment on a similar measure proposed in the Pennsylvania legislature, see
101 U. oF PA. Rlv. 1190 (1953). During its 1953 session the California legisla-
ture is reported to have passed a similar measure. A.CL.U. Weekly Bulletin
No. 1615, Oct. 12, 1953.
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Unfortunately for determining the validity of such a prescription,
there are as yet no authoritative judicial holdings strictly in
point. 72
A. The Nature of the Privilege.
Recourse to the wording of the federal and state constitutional
sections dealing with the self-incrimination privilege does not ad-
vance appreciably our understanding and knowledge of its scope
or implications for our present inquiry. Both the Ohio arc! United
States constitutions read as follows, insofar as pertinent: "No per-
son .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."173 The Ohio charter was amended in 1912 by ad-
ding the proviso: ".... .but his failure to testify may be considered
by the court and jury and may be made the subject of comment by
counsel." Such an amendment of the fundamental law of the state
was necessary as numerous courts had previously intimated that
the traditional phraseology forbade giving any probative value to
the accused's exercise of his option to refuse to take the stand and
attempt to explain the charges lodged against him.174 The reason
why the defendant's silence could not be officially exploited was not
because it would be unreasonable in all instances to draw an in-
criminating inference from such naturally suspicious conduct, but
because if silence were taken for proof of guilt or comments by
judge or prosecutor drove the accused to choose the only tenable
alternative of subjecting himself to cross-examination, the protec-
tion of the privilege would tend to become illusory.175 While this
might not work an injustice to the average criminal defendant, the
"extrinsic policy" behind the privilege which worked in the long-
run in favor of the innocent accused, 76 and "for conservative and
172 A dismissal without hearing under the more circumscribed Newr York
City Charter provision was upheld in Matter of Koral v. Board of Education,
197 Misc. 221, 94 N.Y. Supp.2d 378 (1950).
173 U.S. Const. Amendment V; Ohio Const I, § 10. Despite the apparent
restriction to "criminal cases," it is uniformly held that the privilege is one
which may be invoked in any legal investigation. See Liacos, Rights of Wit-
nesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B.U.L. RPv. 337, 372 (1953).
174 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1892). The jury is
often cautioned to disregard the defendant's silence. See Bruce, The Right to
Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, 31 MVcn. L. REv. 226
(1932).
175 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2272a (3d ed., 1940).
176 Id. at § 2251, p. 309. The argument here is that closing off the ac-
cused as one source of information compels law enforcement officers to rely
on proficient crime detection techniques rather than grilling suspects. An-
other reason often given for the defendant's privilege not to testify is that
the proceedings determinative of his guilt are thereby rendered more digni-
fied and impartial, without the contest, "in which the pride and ingenuity
of the magistrate are arrayed against the caution or evasions of the accused"
which is implicit in the Continental "inquisitorial system."
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healthy principles of judicial conduct" would be defeated. 177 An ad-
ditional "extrinsic" support for the privilege, also irrelevant to the
establishment of individual guilt, is a humane attitude which saves
even the guilty from a harsh choice among perjury, recalcitrance,
or confession.178 Thus the logic of proof had nothing to do with the
reason for the nearly universal prohibition against comment on re-
fusal of the defendant to testify. Ohio was free to diminish the value
of the privilege to the accused (by sanctioning comment) in view of
the "settled law that the clause of the (federal) Fifth Amendment,
protecting a person against being compelled to be a witness against
himself, is not made effective by the Fourteenth Amendment as a
protection against state action on the ground that freedom from
testimonial compulsion is a right of national citizenship, or because
it is a personal privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Consti-
tution as one of the rights of man that are listed in the Bill of
Rights."'179 Consistent with this present authoritative interpretation
of the United States Constitution, Ohio could, if it so desired, utterly
abolish the privilege in state proceedings.
B. The Law As A Restriction On Exercise Of The State Privilege.
But the Ohio legislature has in a sense gone further than aboli-
tion of the state privilege in one area by imposing the present re-
striction on its public servants. This is so in that the Devine-Cor-
rigan law attaches the condition on continued retention of state
employ of waiver of the federal "Fifth Amendment" privilege in
federal hearings involving subversion, in addition to waiver of the
state privilege in state and local proceedings. Application of the
statute in the state-federal situation raises some distinct problems
from a wholly "horizontal" application. Discussing the latter situa-
tion first, it would seem unlikely that an Ohio court would hold
that a discharge of a public employee for claiming his state consti-
tutional privilege in response to interrogation about Communist
membership by a county grand jury violates the state self-incrimi-
nation clause;180 if judicial displeasure is encountered it will doubt-
less be articulated in different terms. Such reluctance to find the
privilege violated does not necessarily imply a rejection of the his-
toric rule that a privileged refusal to testify is not a legal admission
of guilt, but instead would be premised on the popular aphorism
177 Id-at p. 310.
178 See Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarren Act, and the Privilege
against Self-incrimination, 18 U. oF Cnr. L. REv. 687, 692-3 (1951).
179 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 47 (1947).
1SOBut cf. Peck v. Cargill, 167 N.Y. 391, 60 N.E. 775 (1931) (statute in-
valid which called for revocation of liquor license of persons who claimed self-
incrimination before the Liquor Commission).
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that "there is no constitutional right to a public job."'' The trouble
with this plausible-sounding generality is that it asserts both too
much and too little. It is a truism that there is no civil right to
any particular employment, public or private, but once the duty
of performing certain occupational tasks is voluntarily assumed
certainly not all rights as a citizen are suspended18 2 It is specious
reasoning to contend that the exercise of a right is not precluded by
conditioning continued employment on non-exercise, for the loss
of a job, especially under a shadow of suspicion, may be considered
by the employee a more serious deprivation than the infliction of
penal sanctions. Unless reasonably limited such a doctrine of forfei-
ture might place all but the lonely desert anchorite in the category
of second-class citizens, so pervasive today is reliance for business
and pleasure on governmental grants of license or "privilege." To
be anything more than an arbitrary curtailment of the Bill of Rights
the suspension demanded should be such as in the absence of such
express restriction would be read into the contract of employment
as an implied term.
Though not explicitly decided on the "self-incrimination"
ground, most of the analagous cases would seem to impose a "rule
of reason" on terminations of public office for exercise of constitu-
tional rights. Thus a police officer has the right of free speech but
he can hardly expect to keep his badge if he exercises the right by
warning the proprietors of an illegal establishment of an impending
raid.18 3 It would also probably constitute "unbecoming conduct"
for the same officer to refuse to testify concerning the discharge of
his specific duties to prevent crime and disclose any evidence that
-would assist in the apprehension of criminals. 18 4 Similarly it would
be perfectly proper to remove a state auditor who exercised his
privilege in response to an inquest into book-keeping irregularities.
When there is a duty of disclosure touching official acts, the bare
manifested unwillingness to cooperate with law enforcement is clear-
ly incompatible with satisfactory official functioning, regardless of
what may be inferred of guilt of an infamous crime from that act
181 In McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 NZ. 517 (1892), which
involved the dismissal of a policeman for engaging in political activities con-
trary to police regulations, the court, per Holmes, J. said, "The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman."
182 In State ecx rel. Christian v. Barry, 123 Ohio St. 458, 175 N.E. 855 (1931)
it was held that a policeman could ignore a departmental regulation forbidding
the filing of civil suits and still keep his job..
18 3 This is the example used by the California District Court of Appeal in
Christal v. Police Commission of San Francisco, 33 Calif. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d
416 (1939).
184 Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 88 NX.2d 723 (1949).
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alone. The same accountant interrogated about private matters
could be dismissed if he were convicted of auto larceny, but it would
be irrational and unnecessary to predicate his removal on his failure
to furnish the prosecution incriminating evidence against himself.
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court in 1941 reversed a disbarment
order against a lawyer (who was also a municipal court judge)
which was based solely on a refusal to sign an immunity waiver
when called before the grand jury.8 5 This, even though a general
duty to assist the investigation of crime was recognized.
The decided cases therefore emphasize the distinction between
the claim of privilege per se as the disqualifying act and the wit-
ness's claim as a probative fact tending to establish guilt of some
serious felony. If we look at the present statute not as creating a
conclusive presumption of Communist affiliation'8 6 but as a moral
precept which condemns as inconsistent with professional compe-
tency for any assignment a good faith refusal to cooperate with
crime detection, we must revise our thinking about the moral char-
acter of the kind of people the constitutional privilege was meant
to protect. Certainly obstruction of proper official inquiry for its
own sake shows a want of good citizenship. But few witnesses to-
day, especially those who have been entrusted with positions of
respect, are so quixotic as to risk conviction of contempt by frivol-
ously invoking the privilege when no personal danger is apprehend-
ed either to liberty or other fundamental values.187 We must assume
that the claim of the right to be silent is viewed by most as a neces-
sary evil to be invoked only to subserve some principle which over-
rides considerations of present discomfort from public ridicule. The
principle might be that of self-preservation which could motivate
both guilty and innocent. The witness who has never engaged know-
ingly in criminal behavior could in perfect good faith and conscience
185 In re Holland, 377 111. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941). Two other similar hold-
ings involving attorneys who refused to testify to incriminating matters be-
fore a board of inquiry into unlawful and unethical practices, are Matter of
Ellis, 282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E.2d 967 (1940) and Matter of Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26
N.E.2d 963 (1940).
186 The particular rationale behind the Devine-Corrigan Law may have
undergone a change in its passage through the legislature. Whereas now
the act of claiming the privilege "shall constitute unfitness," the original bill
made proof of such act "prima-facie evidence that he is a Communist or a
knowing member of a Communist front or subversive organization." H.B.
No. 575, 100th Gen. Assembly (1953).
187 The witness is not the sole judge of the validity of the claim of priv-
ilege. He can be required, on pain of punishment for contempt, to disclose
enough to show a real possibility that an answer to the question will tend,
rightly or wrongly, to convict him of a crime. Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479 (1951).
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validly refuse to disclose apparently self-incriminatory facts.1 8 3 Does
a public career exact selflessness to the extent of voluntarily put-
ting one's head in a noose intended for others? Another motivating
principle might be a disinclination to "peach" on past and present
friends and associates. 189 In America the informer is undoubtedly
useful and possibly indispensable to adequate law enforcement, but
he has seldom in our ethos and folklore been attractively depicted.
Lastly, a non-Communistic, wholly loyal American might disapprove
so strongly of the investigation itself or its methods that he cannot
give it any more cooperation than the bare minimum he believes is
legally demanded of him. To hold that such a principled stand, on
a legal ground probably suggested by counsel, would in all cases be-
tray subversive tendencies is to overindulge the wisdom and in-
tegrity of all present and future official investigators into the mat-
ter of disloyalty. Only last term the United States Supreme Court
reversed a congressional contempt conviction of a witness of an
extremely conservative stripe on the ground that Congress had no
business delving into the shaping of public opinion through the
188 In investigations of traditional crime, the case would be comparatively
rare where an innocent accused could validly maintain that disclosure of
some fact (such as presence at the scene of the murder of his worst enemy)
would furnish a link in a chain of evidence needed for prosecution. Such
perplexing situations, unfortunately, may become more frequent under crim-
inal statutes outlawing certain groups because of their attachment to certain
beliefs. For example, a liberal might in the past have been considerably ac-
tive in a group working for slum clearance. Subsequently, he may learn to
his surprise that the Government considers the group Communist-dominated
and intends to prosecute its members. The liberal might have been somewhat
incautious in choosing his associates but he is not thereby a dangerous enemy
agent. Assuming prosecution of him is not barred by limitations, he might
validly refuse to furnish additional proof from which a jury might infer
knowing support of seditious activity. As to when the statute of limitations
begins to run on conspiracy, see United States v. Rosen, 174 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.,
1949).
As to fear of an ill-founded perjury prosecution based on denial of mem-
bership, see letter of Dean Paul Andrews to N. Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 26, 1953.
But Cf. Meltzer, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Practical Considera-
tions 9 BuLLEn= OF THE ATo~Rc ScmrxsTs 176 (1953).
189 The privilege, of course, is personal and may not be invoked in behalf
of others. If the witness is willing to testify about his own past activities but
not willing to implicate others, he must claim the privilege regarding his
own affairs or go to jail. This seems to be true even if the revelation of the
names of associates tends further to incriminate by furnishing the names of
potential prosecution witnesses, for the prior incriminating admission will be
taken as "waiver" of the privilege as to further details. Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). Of course, if there existsa real danger of increas-
ing the risk of prosecution, the fact that there is also present in the witness
various other motivations, such as the desire to protect his friends and to pro-
test, is immaterial.
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printing and distribution of political tracts.190 Does the attempt to
vindicate the principle of a free press tell us anything unfavorable
about moral character? 191 It is true that objections to pertinancy
and scope of inquiry should not be asserted under the guise of the
self-incrimination clause, but the acceptance of inept legal advice
might be responsible for resort to the Fifth Amendment where rights
under the First are felt to be in jeopardy.1 92 One need not subscribe
to the viewpoint expressed by our greatest living scientist to main-
tain that persons of great worth and intellectual ability may feel
today or tomorrow that the legislative power to investigate has been
corrupted to the point where a show of civil disobedience is the
last alternative in efforts to preserve free institutions.9 3
C. Due Process And Equal Protection
But if the claim of privilege standing by itself is ambiguous
with respect to the moral character of the claimant, it is even more
so with respect to whether past or present membership in the Com-
munist Party is involved. There is no need here to restate the argu-
ments, pro and con, as to whether a known Communist should be
employed by the state even as a washroom attendant; it must be
assumed that such a discrimination eo nomine would be today uni-
190 United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41 (1952). In the case of Emspak v.
United States, 203 F.2d 54 (D.C., 1952) the Supreme Court has recently
agreed to review the question of whether Congress has the authority to com-
pel disclosure of political views and affiliations-U.S.-, 74 S. Ct. 23 (1953).
191 To the extent that claiming the Fifth when the First Amendment is
the actual ground is a misrepresentation, such conduct is morally question-
able. To claim only the latter will probably result in a jail sentence. Barsky
v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C., CA, 1948). Moral courage might call
for martyrdom, but a considerable body of legal opinion apparently supports
the view that the privilege is not being misused when the intent is only to
curb investigatory power felt to be unduly oppressive. See, e.g., Redlich and
Franz, Does Silence Mean Guilt? 176 Nation 471, 476 (June 6, 1953);
cf. Remarks of Professor Kalven in "The Use and Meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment," U. of Chli. Round Table, No. 802, Aug. 23, 1953. In any event it can hard-
ly be maintained that delinquency of this order of refinement threatens to im-
pair "the discipline and efficiency of the public service."
192 See remarks of Professor Maggs at the "Round Table" discussion of
"The Use and Meaning of the Fifth Amendment": "The ordinary witness is not
a lawyer. Ie does not have a lawyer at his side. He may have claimed the
privilege (in response to the question as to present Communist affiliation).
The committee may have permitted him to rest on the privilege though it ac-
tually was not applicable. Even then, with the universities' rule of thumb
that present membership in the Communist Party does disqualify, each case
should be investigated to see whether my rule Of law really applies. (viz.,
that a proper claim of the privilege requires an inference that the witness is
now a member of the Communist Party.)" op. cit. supra note 191.
193 Open letter from Dr. Albert Einstein advising intellectuals to refuse
to testify before Congressional investigating committees probing beliefs and
affiliations. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1953, p. 1, col 6.
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versally upheld.19 4 But if the statute creates an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that anyone refusing to deny Communist membership is
a member in fact, the reasonableness of such a coerced nexus may
come in question under "due process."' 95 Once we accept the possi-
bility that the non or ex-Communist may seek shelter under the
privilege, to accept the statute we must approve the elimination
from public service of actually loyal functionaries about whom
there is only a suspicion of subversive designs. Whether it is "pat-
ently arbitrary or discriminatory"' 96 for a state to so protect itself
from subversion of its functions (and public disfavor for harboring
"unfriendly witnesses") cannot be answered with certainty. Even
if discharge under taint of disloyalty is not technically punishment,
a rule requiring such a deprivation of livelihood from a class of per-
sons whose only distinguishing feature is the performance of a high-
ly ambiguous act, consistent both with loyalty and disloyalty, is not
immune from attack under the Fourteenth Amendment "due proc-
ess" and "equal protection" clauses, simply because public hire is
not "property." The high court has never accorded carte blanche to
any and all terms of public employment devised by state and na-
tional governments and has in fact emphasized that "Congress could
not enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro
shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall
attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work."'9 7 One's
194 Cases cited note 134 supra. These cases, however, do not involve dis-
missals for Communist affiliation but the validity of loyalty oath requirements.
If United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) is still good law, then depriva-
tion of the right to follow one's profession under an imputation of disloyalty is
"punishment" which can only be inflicted by procedures satisfying due process.
The text statement assumes a professing Communist Party member active in
furthering the revolutionary aims of his group. Notice however the reasoning
which must be employed to reach the ultimate finding of present disloyalty,
even when it is assumed that only the guilty invoke the privilege: (1) Claim
of privilege equals "knowing" membership in the Party at any time during
the past period within the statute of limitations; (2) Such membership has
continued up till the present; (3) Such present membership is equivalent to
present and personal advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government (the
ground for dismissal under the recent Hoffman Law). Cf. partial dissent of
Mr. Justice Burton in Garner v. United States, 341 U.S. 716, 729:
"It [the oath] leaves no room for a change of heart It calls for more
than a profession of present loyalty or promise of future attachment- It
is not limited in retrospect to any period measured by reasonable rela-
tion to the present."
19S Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
196 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
197 United Public Workers v. Mlitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947). In both
the Wieman case, ibid, and Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1951)
the Court expressly or tacitly rejected the argument that the fact of mem-
bership alone disqualifies an employee. "Indiscriminate classification of in-
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final assessment of the validity of the new Ohio statute will depend
on a prophecy on where the judicial line will be drawn "at which
freedom or 'privilege' begins to be qualified by duty or obliga-
tion-"19 8 Few could find fault if the statute only created "a heavy
burden of proof" of fitness to serve the state and laid upon each ap-
pointing authority an "obligation to re-examine (an employee's)
qualifications" in the light of the display of a lack of candor. If, on
the other hand, no hearings were contemplated whereat the claim-
ant's personal motivations could be explored, to constitute automatic
grounds of discharge the coverage of the statute could be contracted
to apply to situations where the shield of privilege violates a special
duty, inhering in the nature of the particular office involved, to
make full and voluntary disclosure touching official acts. 199 There
is really no urgent necessity to go the limit in such cases. If the Act
is really aimed at ridding the public service and schools of subver-
sives, and not solely intended to punish a non-conformist professor
whose worst offense is incurring the displeasure of public opinion
and hence casting suspicion in the patriotism of his employer, its
purpose could be more justly realized by utilization of the clearly
valid Hoffman Act 200 which specifies the new disloyalty "causes for
removal." There is no call to act on unsupported surmise when an
employee fails to affirm or deny publicly that he is a Communist.
The appropriate administrative official could examine the witness
nocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power."
Id. at 191. Under the Feinberg Law approved in Adler proof of knowing mem-
bership in a subversive organization (so determined after notice and hear-
ing) created only a rebuttable presumption of unfitness to teach. The pre-
sumption under the Devine-Corrigan Law is conclusive of unfitness to hold
any state job -garbage collector or head of the state police alike.
19s Quotation from statement of March 24, 1953, issued by the Associa-
tion of American Universities.
199It is certainly open to argue that a special duty of candor rests on
university professors, and possibly teachers at all levels, concerning Commu-
nist connections. Certainly intellectual integrity and honesty are only possible
when the mind is free, and the free and unbiased pursuit of truth is im-
possible for anyone under the Communist discipline. See Hook, Heresyyes-
Conspiracy, no, c. 11 (1953). In this sense, a faculty member's thinking in
relation to his field of study is as much an "official act" as the routine functions
of the policeman -both in order to be effective have to be beyond suspicion of
any incompatible commitments. But there the similarity ends. The pedagogue,
having no duty to suppress crime, is answerable only to the university when
his intellectual independence is put in question. Should he refuse to affirm or
deny his subjection to some absolutism before his colleagues, they would be re-
miss if they kept him. But his duty to aid law enforcement is no different from
the average citizen's. Hence, his claim of privilege before a congressional com-
mittee, which has no proper interest in his academic integrity, is toto coelo
different in its bearing on the obligations of teaching than a similar silence
at a tenure hearing.
20o See Section V, supra.
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personally, inquiring into his present, recent, or pertinently past
membership in, or submission to the discipline of, the Communist
Party or other totalitarian organizations. A persistent refusal to
answer the affiliation questions before the employer or a Civil Serv-
ice Board would by itself satisfy the traditional ground of insubor-
dination.
D. Privileges and Immunities of National Citizenship
There are some additional legal problems that may arise in the
"vertical" federal hearing-state removal situation. The state officer
or employee queried about Communist affiliation by a national court
or committee knows that if he resorts to the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to refrain from incriminating himself under the Smith Act 20 '
he will forthwith lose his occupational status in his home state. Such
a deterent operates effectively to deprive him of a possibly quite
valuable "privilege" of national citizenship. Can the states make
continued retention of public employment turn on the bare exercise
of a constitutional privilege specifically guaranteed to all citizens?
The Fourteenth amendment and implementing legislation denies
the states the right to deprive a citizen of the United States of "a
privilege or immunity arising out of the nature and essential char-
acter of the national government and granted or secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States."20 2 While the self-incrimination privi-
lege in purely state proceedings is not such a "privilege or immunity
of United States citizenship"20 3 there is no reason to exclude from
this category the Fifth amendment privilege which is invocable in
federal proceedings. 204 As contrasted with qualifications for federal
jury service and voting in elections for federal offices, 20 5 both "fed-
eral privileges," the Constitution demands that no person (in a fed-
eral hearing) shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The present statute may be vulnerable as it is not aimed at the abuse
of a constitutional right but makes the bare claim of privilege the
ground for discharge. If it only treated such a claim as an eviden-
tiary fact of appropriate weight going to the question of membership
in a revolutionary or totalitarian group, disentitling the employee
to perform the functions of his office, it would constitute no "de-
201 62 Stat. 808, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1948). See Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159 (1950).
202 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). Civil redress at
law or equity is provided by the Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 8
U.S.C.A. § 43 (1940).
203 See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1943).
204 See Note, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 989, 1001, at n. 18 (1940) for digest of cases
recognizing various federal "privileges."
20S The federal statutes in these areas allow qualifications to vary from
state to state. 36 Stat. 1164 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 411 (1928) (federal jurors);
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2(1); U.S. Const. Amend. XV-16 Stat. 140 (1870), 8
U.S.C.A. § 31 (1942) (voters in federal elections).
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privation," as the reprisal of discharge from employment would be
attributable not to the bare exercise of a federal right but to the
past or present conduct or associations of the employee.20 6
Whether the blanket imposition of the duty to make truthful
and candid answers to pertinent questions about Communist affili-
ations is reasonable or not will ultimately depend on balancing the
state interest sought to be protected, i.e. maintenance in the pub-
lic's mind of the integrity and good repute of state functions, and
the public interest in preserving an accusatorial rather than inquisi-
torial system of criminal justice in political trials. 207 If the beam is
tipped in favor of present state interest it will probably be because
the historic privilege has undergone a devaluation in relation to
other fundamental civil liberties. It may well be that the privilege
has outlived its usefulness, unduly hampering the efficient admin-
istration of justice, and that we need no longer fear the establish-
ment of inquisitorial agencies, like the hated English Court of Star
Chamber, which can bring religious and political non-conformists
within the penalties of the law by means of their own testimony.
Yet others have argued, and not without cogency, that the events
and atmosphere of today are dramatically and significantly parallel
to those in which the privilege had its origin.
20 6 See Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F. 2d 136 (2d Cir., 1947), Cert. den. 332 U.S.
825 (1947). (Brooklyn high school teacher discharged for accepting federal jury
service; complaint for damages against school board upheld).
207 For discussion of the incidents of these two systems of criminal jus-
tice, see Frankfurter, J., in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
In such a weighing of competing values, the court would consider not
only whether a rational connection existed between means and end, but the
substantiality of the interest whose protection is sought (cf. Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)), the limited scope of the abridgement (all public
employees for whom the choice between retention of job and exercise of
constitutional right is unreal), and the existence of reasonable alternatives
which do not involve infringement of rights. Cf. American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,392 (1950).
